Cost Of Democracy: A New Analytical Framework Of Democratic Development

In recent years the study of democratic development has been faced with double dilemmas of theory and practice. With regard to theory, the study of democratic development has two problems, that is, fragmentation and simplicity. In term of fragmentation, the main character is that the study of democratic transition and that of democratic consolidation are separated. It leads to the lack of a unified analysis paradigm. In term of simplicity, the main character is the conflict between research methods of the macro perspective and that of the micro perspective. It results in the problem that the complexity of the development of democracy can not be showed. With regard to practice, the study of democratic development is faced with question more sharply. Democratic transition that continues to take place all over the world is tied up with the fact that people pursue for the value of democracy and long for the democratic society with high level of democratic governance. However, the true fact is that the democratic transitions in many countries do not bring freedom and equality, but leads to the severe results, such as the division of the nation, social instability, the slowdown of economy, death and authoritarian nostalgia. The original research is pale in front of the brutal political reality. In fact the dilemmas above derive from the reason that the domestic and foreign scholars and politicians neglect democratic cost which is an important phenomenon in democratic transition. Democratic development is a profound institutional transition. The radical change of society may inevitably bring harm and pain to human beings. If cost of democracy is not taken into serious consideration, the action of rushing to promote democratization cannot bring freedom and prosperity which people are looking forward to, but leads to higher cost that the nation and people have to pay, social division and the damage of productivity. The only way of change current situation is that the epistemology of democratic development should be restructured by the theory of cost of democracy. But now the study cannot meet the need. Specifically, the study of cost of democracy has four problems so far. Firstly, both connotation and denotation of cost of democracy are fuzzy. Academic circles do not yet have the basic consensus about the problem. Secondly, the research level is not high. Much literature are published in the periodicals, but there are no mature monographs or doctoral dissertations. Thirdly, the ability of integrating the current research is inadequate. The current research not only is still constrained by the framework of original research, but also hasn’t been able to integrate the existing research results. Fourthly, the methodology of current research is simple. The current research is still in the stage of qualitative discussion and lacks the quantification of index and international comparison.Thus the author has to construct the new analytical framework of democratic development by the beginning of restructuring the concept of the cost of democracy. Starting from the fundamental issue of social well-being, cost of democracy has triple properties. Firstly, it is the macro property that focuses on social and historical changes. Secondly, it is the property of the value of pursuing social well-being. Thirdly, it is the property of tool which provides the methods of addressing the problems. According to three properties above, the author holds that cost of democracy is not the footnote of the advantages of autocracy, not the normal loss of the democratic society being constructed and working, or the calculation of the cost based on the theory of rational choice. The connotation of cost of democracy contains two levels. Firstly, it is the base layer that frames basic properties and problem orientation of cost of democracy. Secondly, it is the core layer that defines the internal structure of cost of democracy. In terms of the base layer, the connotation of cost of democracy is the cost of democratic development. In terms of the core layer, the internal construction of cost of democracy is made up by two dimensions: the cost of the process and the cost of the outcome. Institutional transition leads to the formation of the cost of the process and the cost of the outcome results from institutional performance. The composition of cost of democracy is based on the standard of nation and the standard of people’s livelihood. The standard of nation includes two aspects: Whether if the development of democracy threats the country’s unity and whether if the development of democracy threats national capacity. The standard of people’s livelihood includes three aspects: security, economy and psychological state. According to above standards, the denotation of cost of democracy includes four indices: the political cost that refers to the degree of the damage of nation which democratic development may leads to, the cost of life that refers to the number of death which political violence leads to, the economic cost that refers to the degree of the damage of economy which democratic development may leads to and the cost of culture that refers to political apathy after finishing democratic transition.The author thinks that cost of democracy has dual attributes. Not only is it a dependent variable, but also it is an independent variable. As the dependent variable, the mechanism of the formation of cost of democracy is the core topic. The mechanism of the formation includes the mechanism of the cost of process and the mechanism of the cost of the outcome. The author holds the view that either fundamental conditions or the choices of strategies leads to the cost of process. Besides, comprehensive factors also may leads to the cost of process. Fundamental conditions include three factors. Firstly, it is the degree of institutionalization of political parties. The higher the degree of institutionalization of political parties is, the more the political participation can effectively be absorbed so that political unrest is avoided and the cost of process reduces. Secondly, it is the type of class structure. Compared with polarized class structure, olivary class structure is more helpful in decreasing the cost of process. Thirdly, it is the atmosphere of political culture. Compared with the political culture of “total win or lose”, the political culture of “compromise and consensus” is helpful in decreasing the cost of process. The choices of strategies include three types. Firstly, it is the strategy of transformation. The strategy that political elites actively promote the development of democracy can effectively control the strength and speed of the transition, so it has the comparative advantage of cost. Secondly, it is the strategy of replacement. The strategy that authoritarian regimes disintegrate by themselves or are overthrown by the opposition produces the uncertainty and instability of the transition, so it may lead to high cost of the process. Thirdly, it is the strategy of transplacement. The strategy that the authoritarian government and the opposition mutually cooperate to promote the development of democracy ensures the well-organized conduct of democratic transition. Thus it has lower cost of the process. Comprehensive factors mainly refer to the situation that “stateness” problem and the sequence of election mix. Compared with the sequence from down to up, the sequence from up to down usually contributes to addressing “stateness” problem and effectively reduces the cost of process. The cost of the outcome is affected mainly by two variables. Firstly, it is social order. Institutional structures affect institutional performance, so the social order of open rights has more advantages of cost than the social order of limited rights. Secondly, it is the design of institutions. It includes three aspects: intergovernmental relations-the relations of the legislative power and executive power, electoral institutions-plurality rule or proportional representation and the relationship between local governments and central-local governments-unitary system and federal system.As the independent variable, the core task is to establish the connection between cost of democracy and the patterns of democratic development. From the perspective of cost of democracy, the author takes advantages of ideal type to construct four patterns of democratic development. Pattern I: the high cost of the process and the high cost of the result. Pattern II: the high cost of the process and the low cost of the result. Pattern III: the low cost of the process and the high cost of the result. Pattern IV: the low cost of the process and the low cost of the result. According to the index of cost of democracy, the author assesses cost of democracy of four nations-Russia, Japan, Argentina and South Korea. According to the outcome of assessment, Russia is Pattern I. Japan is Pattern II. Argentina is Pattern III. South Korea is Pattern IV. Scientific selection of development patterns of cost of democracy should be based on two indicators. In terms of practice, it should be in accordance with the rules of the development of the democracy. In terms of value, it should pursue social well-being. Based on above two standards and comprehensive comparison of four patterns and corresponding cases, the author holds that Pattern IV is the ideal model. Politicians and people should give priority to pattern IV, because the pattern not only closely accords with the basic law of democratic development in the practice, but also gives full attention to human social being in the value. Pattern III is the normal model. It is the second preferences of democratic development. Pattern II is the special model. This pattern is relatively rare, not universal. Pattern I is the abnormal model. This pattern should not be chosen.In order to achieve the ideal pattern, six principles should be obeyed. Firstly, hold the idea of macro cost-benefit and object to the theory of achieving democracy quickly, the omnipotent theory of democracy, the theory of “End of History” and assumption about rational person. Secondly, foster actively the fundamental conditions of democratic society, such as social order of open rights, economy, social capital, civil society and civic culture. Thirdly, design scientifically the political structure of democratic system to keep the balance between the legislative power and executive power and the balance between local governments and central-local governments. Fourthly, build and improve reasonably the democratic institutionsrepresentative institutions and electoral institutions by improving the level of institutionalization of political parties. Fifthly, slowly and practically promote democratic development with the awareness of national situation, order and compromise. Finally, timely build the mechanism of the compensation of the cost by the methods of addressing authoritarian heritage rationally, providing appropriate material compensation and intervening psychological problems in time.