Research On The Legal Regulatory Issues Of P2P Network Loan

When initially emerged abroad,P2P platform simply acted as infomediary,notdirectly involved in lending practices,but once the P2P network loan was introducedinto our country,it developed the trend of alienation,evolved into credit intermediaryand directly took part in lending practices, inevitably involved with financialinstitutions.In China, the P2P network loan can be broadly classified into threecategories: traditional online mode,offline creditor’s rights transfer mode and compositeguarantee mode.Till now,PPDAI is the only remaining company of the traditional onlinemode.In this mode,the risk of lending manifests as credit risk,technology risk, adverseselection and morality risk;CreditEase belongs to the tipical creditor’s rights transfermode,it splits and transfers bond,makes P2P platform into a capital intermediaryplatform, and to some extent it can be seen as an unlicensed,unregulated“shadowbank”.The biggest risk of this mode is operational risk,suspected illegal fund-raising,illegal pooling of public deposits and suspected personal lending. Compared with thetraditional model, in composite guarantee mode, guarantee agencies are also involved inlending activities,thus can reduce part of the credit risk in lending behavior,but at thesame time increase secured and connected transaction risk.Therefore,no matter whatkind of operation mode will inevitably faces with various risks.To minimize the risk ofharm,it is necessary to find the cause of risks and prevent them.The cause of various risks in P2P network lending activities can be summarizedinto the following three points:First,lack of effective supervision.Before2014,the P2Pindustry in China has been in a state of no governmental supervison.Lack of supervisioncould cause industry chaos and disorderly management,leading to the separation of P2Pnetwork loan from our financial supervision system and frequent risks.Second,incomplete personal credit system.P2P lending platform can not get access to relativelycomplete credit information like banks.When examining the creditability ofborrowers,P2P lending platform tends to rely on limited information to make decisions.Without doubts,the industry credit risk will follow.Third, asymmetricinformation problem in lending activities is the major cause of adverse selection andmorality risk.In the market,due to asymmetric information in both sides of thetransactions,combined with interest-driven, the withdrawal of high quality borrowersfrome the market is bound to happen.The overall decline in the quality of the borrowerswill form the “bad money drives out good money”phenomenon.In recent years,with the development of diverse patterns in P2P network loan, legalrelations in borrowing activity has become more and more complex,in addition to thegeneral borrowing law,there are also some special legal relationships like guaranteesand creditor’s rights transfer,these affcet the qualitative analysis of P2P network loanplatform.The author thinks that P2P platform should be classified into financial-likeinstitutions and credit intermediary in order to implement classified supervision.Risk supervision issues in internet finance like P2P platform have aroused highattention. On January20,2015, CBRC (China Banking Regulatory Commission)announced the establishment of Pratt&Whitney Finance Department to supervise P2Pnetwork loan. So far, the supervisor of P2P industry has finally confirmed,but thespecific regulations are still in the blank state. In this article,the author argues thatdespite the confirmation of supervisor in this industry,problems cannot be ignored.Forexample, CBRC is not titled to supervise asset securitization process, on the contrary,CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission) is more appropriate to fulfillsupervision in special P2P pattern.Differences in financial-like institution platform and credit intermediary platformshould be considered in supervison of P2P network loan. The principle of classifiedsupervision should be applied into market admittance supervision, operation supervisionand market withdrawal supervision.Only in this way can we make the supervision moretargeted.