An Study Of The Effect Of Manufacturer And Retailer’s Vertical Restraint And The Application Of Antitrust Laws

In August30,2007,"People’s Republic of China anti-monopoly law" on the twenty-ninth session of the Tenth National People’s Congress for approval. In August1,2013, the Shanghai Higher People’s Court on China’s first vertical restraint agreement monopoly civil litigation cases--"Rui Bang v. Johnson case" made the final decision:determining Rui Bang companies" default not illegal", Johnson company" illegal not default". In the case before the trial, there is precedent between manufacturers and retailers for contractual arrangements vertical monopoly investigation and punishment of cases, the more extensive influence and the larger punishment are the price supervision and inspection issued by the national development and Reform Commission and the huge amount of tickets to the vertical monopolistic behavior of Maotai, Wuliangye issued by anti-monopoly Bureau, as well as five vertical monopoly agreements on imported milk powder manufacturers to make the decision on punishment in2013.This study is based on the above background, whether in the "Rui Bang v. Johnson case" and "Maotai,Wuliangye case" and "imported milk powder case" decision or punishment, or the national development and Reform Commission on transnational corporate giants of penalty in July,2014. In essence, the core questions are for the manufacturer and retailer vertical restraint effect as "benign" or "malignant" assessment.Vertical restraint is a long-term contract terms, binding and different from other simple fixed unit price contract signed by both parties in the transaction. Vertical restraint is often constrained a party to the transaction in some way (upstream or downstream manufacturers retailers). This constraint is not so strict vertical integration, therefore, the vertical restraint is between the bureaucratic command system and market trading system, the vertical restraint may be lead by manufacturers, retailers may also be dominant. No matter who is dominant, we hope that the research is clear, the retailer or manufacturer of the executed judgment and decision of punishment is justified in qualitative and quantitative? If it is reasonable, and what is the economics and law on the basis of the principles behind it?This paper first briefly introduces the research background, research significance, research content, research methods and the structure arrangement. In the part of literature review, this paper introduces the definition and main types of vertical restraints according to the related literature, reviews the vertical restraints leading manufacturers and retailers separately, and summarize relevant literature empirical research methods.Secondly, the theoretical analysis section describes the systematic vertical restraint "Motivation-Conditions-Effect" of economic analysis framework, that is, when assess on the vertical restraint, not only analyzes the market structure in which the parties to the agreement, and their position in the relevant market, but also analyzes the motives and effects of competitive constraints. In this section, analyzes the main factors that constitute the market structure-the impact of market forces on the constraint effect between retailers and manufacturers.Next is a summary of the use of empirical research in different industries and different premise, the impact of the leading manufacturer of vertical restraints on consumer welfare, product prices, retailers leading vertical restraints impact on product prices, investment and innovation power.Again summarizes the changes in the development process of the United States, the European Union and the Chinese anti-monopoly law enforcement, comparative study of the applicability of the antitrust laws by States.Finally summarized the paper and draw a conclusion:In leading manufacturer level, spontaneous formation of vertical restraints can benefit consumers and improve the welfare of producers, but vertical restraints imposed by external forces is difficult to improve the social welfare, in leading retailer level, vertical restraints can bring higher benefits and lower product prices for consumers, and encourage manufacturers to increase the input of innovation. In terms of policy suggestion, based on the results of the empirical study, proposed should give manufacturers and retailers more liberal policy environment. In addition, in vertical application of anti-monopoly law, put forward to make clear other typical vertical monopoly agreements, such as the vertical territorial restriction, exclusive dealing; clear provisions do not expressly exempted vertical monopoly agreements; for the exemption procedures, we should explicitly declare confirm or apply directly using the system, etc. This paper also puts forward the next research direction, namely the assessment of vertical restraint effect should be broken down to a specific industry, try to use empirical research methods to analyze, in order to provide great reference value for the government decision-making and the anti-monopoly law enforcement of china in practice.The innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in the following aspects:First, elaborate theoretical framework, clearly show vertical restraint "motives-conditions-effects" of the three-stage analysis framework, especially in the condition part, we combine the study of Wu Xuliang and Zhang Zan innovatively, and combine the buyer-seller monopoly power and consumer groups into vertical market in the past, and comparative analysis of the welfare effects of six vertical market structure.Second, unlike the previous literature only to analyze the dominant retailer or manufacturer-led vertical restraints effect, this paper analyzes the effect of vertical restraint both leading retailers and leading manufacturer, expect to be able to provide a research framework as complete as possible in vertical restraint category.Third, using the method of empirical studies to estimate the effect of vertical restraint from the perspective of quantitative analysis, and draw a conclusion that spontaneous formation of vertical restraints can benefit consumers and improve the welfare of producers, but vertical1restraints imposed by external forces is difficult to improve the social welfare.Fourth, compare the application of anti-monopoly law, analyze the changes in the development process of the United States, the European Union and the Chinese anti-monopoly law enforcement, and try to find out the trends based on the change.