| Abstract:The key contradiction of China’s urban house demolition compensation is embodied in fairness. When the demolition compensation price does not reflect reasonable distribution of the real estate appreciation income, the urban house demolition project will not get a universal acceptance. Different ways of demolition also have a significant influence in fairness of the demolition compensation. Which way of demolition can make compensation price more equitable? How can we make it return to fairness when compensation price is not equitable? All these questions are necessary and emergency. So solving them effectively has important theoretical and practical significance.This article firstly reviewed the recent urban house demolition compensation fairness status, and described the related fairness game theory model and experiments. On the basis of comparatively analyzing different types of fairness theory models and experiments, and combining behavior features of main game players in different ways of demolition. relocation of the main of the game were constructed in different ways, this paper constructed demolition compensation fairness game models under different ways of demolition individually, and analyzed the fairness meaning of strategy equilibriums. Subsequently, applying z-Tree software to simulate real-life situations of relocation compensation, this paper designed and carried out three experiments:second party punishment ultimatum game experiments under non-mandatory demolition, free of punishment dictator game experiment under mandatory demolition, and introduction of third-party organizations third-party punishment game experiment under forced evictions.Through comparative analysis of results of the experiments we can know that:under non-mandatory demolition, compensation game between demolisher and the demolition can achieve an fair equilibrium; under mandatory demolition, compensation game between government and the demolition tends to deviate from an fair equilibrium; under mandatory demolition, game equilibrium can return to fairness when there has an third-party organization to conduct supervision and punishment; under second party punishment, demolisher’s expected punishment possibility is above the actual punishment possibility, under third-party punishment, government’s expected punishment possibility is under the actual punishment possibility, and comparing of the second party punishment, third-party punishment can make the game equilibrium fairer and has a better restricted effect upon demolition compensation. Finally, this paper took Changsha’s two real demolition compensation cases for example to prove the conclusions and put forward relevant policy recommendations. All these provided practical support for this paper. |
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