An Inquiry Into The Notion Of Knowledge By Acquaintance

In 1905, Bertrand Russell first distinguished two kinds of knowledge:knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. He defined knowledge by acquaintance as follows:"I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object".2 From Russell’s perspective, the characteristic of this kind of knowledge is directness, which is one part of my presentation and is exclusive of any judgment. Russell intended to describe knowledge by acquaintance as a fundamental paradigm which can provide both directness and foundation for knowledge.Regrettably, Russell failed to finish his project. My thesis will focus on the discussions after 1905 and I will consider direct cognition as knowledge by acquaintance. I will begin my description with Russell’s acquaintance theory, and seek to demonstrate both the insights and flaws in his work. In Chapter Two, I will discuss the criticism of the notion of knowledge by acquaintance. My task is to explain the opposition that arose from Sellars, Davidson and Ryle. They aim at the fact that acquaintance can not take directness and fundamentalness into consideration at the same time. In Chapter Three, I will deploy Richard Fumerton’s non-inferential justification (NIJ) to revise acquaintance theory. This revision can be seen as acquaintance theory in the narrow sense. Unlike Fumerton’s approach, David Woodruff Smith argues why intentionality is the main element in acquaintance theory. I think this intentional dependence approach can be confirmed as acquaintance theory in the broader sense. The common traits shared by two acquaintance theory approaches will allow us to compare them. From my point of view, acquaintance theory in the narrow sense aim at the ideal blueprint for epistemology. Whereas, acquaintance theory in the broad sense show us the factual programme for epistemology. Lastly, I will illustrate the characteristics of acquaintance theory and give my own personal comments on it.