A Study Of Husserl’s And Kripke’s Theory Of Proper Name

What is proper name and how does it work in consciousness? Whether does it have signification as the species-name does? For Husserl, proper name is not the focal point of his study, but this problem concerns whether the idealism itself can apply to all the acts. For Kripke’s analytic philosophy, proper name is the focal point of his philosophy, the reference function of the proper name concerns the connotation and denotation’s theory. With a study of Husserl and Kripke’s philosophy, I want to give a comparative view of proper name.I have a study of Husserl’s sign theory, intentionality theory, intuition theory respectively, also of his critique of Mill’s proper name theory. In Husserl’s view, sign does not have signification, but it can address to the object through association function. Signification is species object and the essence of expression. In intuition, the proper name directs itself to an individual object, so how does the proper name work in intuition and the intentional act? By analysis we find that for Husserl the proper name does not have the authentic meanings. It is sign and fulcrum. The proper name connects with the intuitional manifold by association.For Kripke’s part, through his theory of causal (historical) chain, prior accidental proposition and apodictic inevitable proposition, the probable world and description, we have a study of his theory of proper name. Kripke does not agree with the theory of description. He believes that the description is not the sense of proper name due to the fact that description does not have strict meaning for certain referent. A referent may lose certain property, namely, in variation or in people’s assumptions, but never lose its proper name. The proper name is attached to an object and referent for the beginning through the function of historical chain. At last, we conclude that in Kripke’s view, the proper name is only a sign but does not have authentic meaning.So we can find that Husserl who is a membership of continental philosophy, and Kripke, who is a membership of British and American analytic philosophy, have some consensus with proper name. We summerize their consensus, and also have an analysis with their differences.