On Hume’s Idea Of The Self

In a Treatise of Human Nature, there are two kinds of interpretation of the idea of the self from Hume. The first one supposes that the idea of self is some kind of fiction from our thought, therefore denying the reality of the self. The other interpretation treats the self as the ultimate object of some particular passions, like pride. It seems to be contradictory because the second thought supports the reality of the self. In this essay, I will analyze the Book I and Book II of the Treatise, trying to treat the idea of the self as a firmly constructed system made up by perceptions with similar or/and causal relation, from the positive view. In this way, the Humean self is consistent.Moreover, Hume admitted in the Appendix of the Treatise that there is a mistake in the chapter illuminating the personal identity or the self, and he felt confused about it. I will also list four mean interpretation of it and disproof them. Finally, an alternative of interpretation will be given, supposing that Hume’s real problem is he cannot proof the diachronic identity of the self.