Research On The Determinant And Prevention Of Doctors’ Moral Hazard In The Social Medical Insurance

In order to solve the problems of people’s preventing and curing disease, social medical insurance system is established in our country. But there are many problems in the system such as information asymmetry, under the protection of this system, the doctors as a medical service provider using their own advantages that engaged in the risk of moral hazard for individual profits. The doctors’ moral hazard behavior causes waste of medical resources, the unreasonable growth of medical expense and the nervous of doctor-patients’ relationship. This behavior affects the sustainable development of the social medical insurance system seriously in our country and threats social stability and harmony. But just to solve information asymmetry in social medical insurance or disease uncertainty, does not prevent doctors’ moral hazard very well. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the factors of doctors’ moral hazard in the social medical insurance. On the basis of the analysis take feasible measures to prevent the doctors’ moral hazard. To achieve the purpose of social medical insurance guarantee people’s life and health, and achieve the stable development of the social medical insurance.This paper first discusses the research background and significance, then has carried on the literature review at home and abroad, and introduces the research method, content and innovation points of this article, the overall research direction is determined. Secondly expounds the concepts, characteristics and performance associated with doctors’ moral hazard in social health insurance, and analyzes the evolution of moral hazard in social health insurance, and then the principal-agent theory and game theory used in this paper are introduced. The next analysis was conducted on the basis of definite concepts and theories. Then focus to the doctor of fixed-point hospital as the research object found that the factors influencing the doctors’ moral hazard is not limited to only doctor this subject through the interview. To encode the data from the interview can be found, doctors’ moral hazard involved five interest-relevant subjects which influences the behavior of doctors’ moral hazard directly or indirectly. Then analyses on the result of the previous chapter, finds out the deciding factor from the influencing factor, and do the game analysis. To analyze the five subjects which influencing the doctors’ moral hazard with the data model can be established. The government, the fixed-hospitals and the supervision of the patients determine the doctors’ moral hazard in social health insurance; do game theory analysis with determinants. Finally, according to these research and analysis, from the perspective of the five subject to puts forward the doctors’ moral risk prevention measures with subject supervision as the center.This paper use the literature research, interviews and the game theory analysis method, systematic analysis of doctors’ moral hazard in social medical insurance, puts forward some concrete preventive measures. This paper has certain innovation in research perspectives and research content, choose different perspective from past research to analyze the doctors’ moral hazard problems, from the view of interest-related subject to look at this problem, analyzes the main influencing factors; And puts forward some measures to prevent the doctors’ moral hazard, to regulate the behavior of interest-related subjects, arouse doctor’s enthusiasm and subjectivity, to build a harmonious and trust medical environment.