The Supervision Research On Physicians’ Behaviors Of Excessive Profit-orientation

The universal coverage of medical insurance policy has made medical insurance bureaubecome the biggest payer of medical expense. In order to maintain the balanced operation ofthe medical insurance system, it is the responsibility of medical insurance bureau to supervisephysicians’ behaviors of excessive profit-orientation. The whole paper has four chapters andthe main content is as following: in the2ndchapter, the first issue is the origin of physicians’behaviors of excessive profit-orientation---the prescribing power and the medical producers’interest induction. The next issue is the weakness of current supervision mechanism. It is notdifficult to draw the equilibrium states of T periods from the ones of the early three periods.With the method of reduction to absurdity, It is not difficult to prove that in long-term repeatedgames, physicians and medical producers could not betray each other but coincidentlymaintain silence.Consequently, the legal supervision encounters proof difficulties when itcomes to commercial bribe charge. Since the economical supervision strategy strives noexpense-control motive on physicians and judges blindly on the reasonability of surplus,physicians could transfer the surplus expense to patients.The3rdchapter argues the improvedsupervision strategies.On the aspect of the economic supervision, doctors’ response behaviormodel to sharing the benefit of surplus indicates that they will select the one of higher interestbetween following the medical insurance and pursuing excessive profit-orientation basing onthe condition of specific patient. It is the best of supervisor to regulate the prices of drugs andmedical devices which are list on the menu of medical insurance and control the behavior ofoverloading medicare expense standard. The doctors response model to clarifying behavior ofexcessive profit-orientation indicates that doctors will select the bigger one between thecurrent value of medicare doctors and none-medicare doctors. Supervisor should give themedicare doctors the patient of critical conditions, punish the one who break the medicarerules and limit the patient resources of none-medicare doctors. The target model of rationaleconomic men indicates that patient’ sensitivity of medicare quality is the key factor of bestutilizing medicare resources. The technological supervision strategies are listed below. By theregression model of maximum medical cost and the benefit of excessive profit-orientation, it iseasy to judge the quantity relationship between the above two factors from regressivecoefficient. Samely, it is not difficult to judge the quantity relationships between surplusmedical expense&expense of drugs and medical devices and the behavior of excessive profit-orientation from the coefficients of the related regression models. By setting andcomputing the logic regression model, the supervisor get the probability of cure on the cost ofC1. The4thchapter contains the conclusion of supervision. From the conclusion of theeconomical strategy: the supervisor should follow the fact that doctors are rational economicmen and execute suitable policy which make physicians automatically abide it; the focus ofsupervision should be on the medicare doctors who could obey the regulations and execute thepolicy which constrains the none medicare doctors; in order to compress the the space offinancial tie between doctors and producers, supervisor should regulate the price of drugs andmedical device which are listed on the menu of medical insurance; and the patients wouldorientate which doctors the money should be paid for. The technology supervision draws thefollowing conclusions:patients’ right of medical insurance, which could increase the obstacleof doctors’ orientation of the maximum cost, should be taken seriously; supervisor should paymore attention on surplus expense and the dual supervision goals include both expense controland maintenance of quality.