The Empirical Study About Heterogeneity Of Institutional Shareholders And Real Activities Manipulation

The theory of Ownership Structure Balance holds the idea that the reasonable equity arrangement can promote the formation of balance and mutual supervision between shareholders,and then improve the corporate government structure and the quality of accounting information in the public companies. As new participants, institutional investors hold the stocks of the listed companies and become the shareholders of these companies with the advantages in information,scale and knowledge. While in order to verify whether institution investors can participate in corporate governance actively and supervise the management,this paper discusses the relationship between institutional shareholders and real activities manipulations. This study takes the listed companies in A share main board stock markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen as the lord sample. Considering the heterogeneity of institutional investors,the study will classify them based on the shares and types. The results indicates that:(1)the whole institutional investors restrain real activities manipulations,and play a positive role in corporate governance;(2)institutional investors with less than30%shareholdings,restrain the real activities manipulations, on the contrary, institutional investors with more than30%shareholdings, will aggravate the activities;(3)funds for investment in securities, QFII and social security funds have positive roles in corporate governance, and yet insurance companies and securities companies have no influence on governance.