Analysis Of The Asymmetric Pricing Behavior Of Large Supermarkets

In the era of the buyer’s market, most products are in the condition of oversupply, especially in the industry of the fast moving consumption goods. It means that the controlling of the distribution channels of commodities is the focus of the battle between a manufacturer and a distributor. If the large supermarket has gain the competitive advantage, it will use its dominant position and the advantages of being a sales platform to charge large numbers of money from the upstream suppliers on the one hand, and do lots of favor for consumers so as to be competitive compared with other dealers. In recent years, with the gradual warming of inflation and the aggravation of the conflicts between the suppliers and shopkeepers, the phenomenon of "the behavior of asymmetric pricing" in the retail market is a hot topic in the industry, and most of the media, businesses and academics hold that the slotting allowance of large supermarkets is the chief culprit of the rising of price, the intensification of the conflicts between suppliers and dealers. Seen from all the studies of the slotting allowance, it is clear that most of them are analyzed on the basis of a specific vertical market structure perspective, which can not demonstrate the economic effects that the slotting allowance brought in different market structures, so the conclusions of the existing research can not match the actual situation to a large extent.So it is really necessary to make theoretical and empirical analysis of the formation of the channel fee and the economic effect of the channel fee under different vertical markets. This article first defines the main body of the channel fee, and then discusses the formation mechanism of the channel fee seriously, and lastly, basing on the theoretical analysis, it uses the mathematical model and the empirical data synthetically to analyze the channel fee behavior dialecticalThis paper contains of six parts. The first chapter is introduction, which mainly introduces the background and research significance of the selected topic, and the content and framework of the whole research. The second chapter is the introduction of the related concepts and theories, as well as reviewing the related literature at home and abroad. The third chapter is the analysis of the formation mechanism of the channel fee of supermarkets, and it uses the theory of industrial chain, intermediaries and bilateral market integratedly. It explains the formation mechanism of the channel fee from three aspect, which contains the relationship between the channel controlling and the channel fee, the necessity of the existence of the middlemen, and the pricing behavior of the bilateral market. The fourth chapter is the comparative analysis of the different kinds of channel fee under different vertical market-structures. It compares the economic performance of the channel fee under the market structure of bilateral monopoly, upstream monopoly and downstream oligopoly, and the upstream monopoly with a dominant supermarket in the retail market. The fifth chapter is the empirical analysis of the channel fee of large supermarkets. It takes the channel fee disputes between Carrefour and its suppliers as examples to analyze the essence of the channel fee, as well as verifying the above conclusions by using some empirical data. The sixth chapter contains the conclusion and suggestions of the whole article, and it put forwards some suggestions on the basis of the formation mechanism and economic effect of the channel fee.The research conclusions of this paper are as follows:1. The theoretical and mathematical modeling results show that the slotting fees, which bring different economic effects under different vertical markets, are the inexorable outcome of the development of the commodity economy, and they are also the products that are brought in by the middlemen and the platform vendors.2. It can be seen from the analysis of the whole paper that the economic effects brought by the fixed channel fee are the same under different vertical market structures, and it only results in the vertical transfer of profits from the suppliers to the large supermarkets, and the effects that it brings to other market players and consumers are not very significant. While the economic effects of the linear channel fee are different under different market structures. Under the market structures of the bilateral monopoly and the upstream oligopolistic, the linear channel fee is just another way of the distribution of profits between the suppliers and the supermarket, it has no substantial impacts to both sides; however, in the structure of upstream oligopolistic and it has a dominant supermarket in the downstream, the linear channel charges will bring damages to other small retailers and consumers, and it should be curbed to some extent.3. As the Actual data shows that when the operating income increases, the sales and administration expenses also increase, which means that it is reasonable for the supermarkets to get some slotting allowances to make up its constantly increased costs. And the case studies show that suppliers do not oppose the supermarket of charging some channel fees, what they dissatisfied are that the amount of the fee is too high, too numerous, and there are too many "black box operation".Therefore, it can be concluded from the paper that it is needed to treat the slotting allowance differently under different market structures. And when it comes to make some measures towards the channel fees, recognition of its reasonable existence comes first, and then trying to specify the form and the amount of the fee. On the whole, the conclusions of this study have made up the current view of the channel fees on the one hand, and it also has provided some policy references for the related sections.The innovation points of this paper are:firstly, the analysis of the formation mechanism of the channel fee is based on the theory of industrial chain, the theory of intermediary and the theory of bilateral market. Secondly, it defines the main body of the channel fee as large supermarkets. Thirdly, it analyzes and compares two different charging mechanisms under three different vertical market structures, which is more systematic.