The Correlation Study Of Ownership Structure And Investment Efficiency Of Listing Corporation

An enterprise’s rise and decline is related to its own investment behavior, and investment decision-making scientifically or not depends largely on the corporate governance, because of information asymmetric and agency problem, the corporate governance mechanisms have not been effectively implemented. Scholars coming from domestic and foreign pointed out that, as the cornerstone of corporate governance Based on the perspective of property rights, ownership structure has a decisive role to solve the asymmetric information and agency problems. Researches on ownership structure mainly focus on the relationship with corporate performance, but not much with the investment efficiency.We use the methods which combine normative and empirical research when we study the correlation between ownership structure and the efficiency of investment.The research based on the theories of corporate governance, property rights and information asymmetry. We use the game theory analysis in order to analyze the action mechanism of ownership concentration, euqity restriction ratio and ownership property in the investment decision.As the method to measure investment efficiency,we use the expected inverstment model by Richardson (2006).The paper apply descriptive statisitics analyze,correlation analysis and multiple linear regression method to test the relationship of these factors and non-efficiency investment.The study showed that:First of all,Inefficency investment is very common in China.There are1831over-investment samples and3770underinvestment samples in all5601samples. Secondly, the largest shareholders are positive to ease inefficient investment through the right of control.Thirdly, equity balance degree does play a role in the suppression of inefficient investment and studies have shown that equity balance may inhibit the inefficiency of investment on existence "interval effect"; Forthly, executive ownership can mitigate inefficient investment of listed company, however they may conspire with dominant shareholders when in the companies of high ownership concertration.