The Research Of Quality Risk Control And Incentive Mechanism In Outsourcing

These years the supply chain management is generally applied in manufacturing industry management, many enterprises concentrate on this idea and participate in this trade, their management method and strategy has changed deeply. They mainly focus on their superiority and apply it completely. They do core business while transferring non-core business to other cooperatives, which help companies do specialize in fine, however the quality control in the supply chain becomes very complicated. Within the last couple of years in home, food quality safe events occur frequently, leaving companies realized that quality is the foothold of the supply chain operating; ensuring product quality is one of an important goal of supply chain management.Firstly, this paper builds up profits model of both supply chain, which involved OEM and CM profit models. We also consider quality level as an important factor to influence target profit of the two parties. We determine other relative contract parameters through quality level at the same time, which will provide the makers of supply chain powerful basis when they draft contract. We start from reality of supply chain environment in addition to these relative parameters, and bring in risk aversion of contractor CM,we consider them as risk aversion enterprises to analyses, it is very coincident with complex and rapid growth supply chain, it possesses higher research value.Secondly, according to different efforts on quality level by supply chain subject, we consider contract-issuing party and contractor’s target profit function from unilateral moral hazard and double moral hazard condition respectively. To the problem of building up target profit function, traditional research adopt linear profit distribution model,but this paper uses preferable nonlinear contract format, it has innovative character. The contract model of this paper is enclosed four principal lines to continue, these are:linear contract model under unilateral moral hazard, nonlinear contract model under unilateral moral hazard,linear contract model under double moral hazard and nonlinear contract model under double moral hazard.Lastly, we determine contract parameters entirely through series of solving models, that is:one-off payment, paying unit, market price and revenue sharing functions.At the same time, we analyses that what kind of contract model can gain optimal profit under the same supply chain environment, the result is:OEM always gains the higher profit by nonlinear contract format than that by linear contract format. It needs point out that we discuss the problems from symmetrical information and Asymmetrical information no matter which contract format it is, the primary result indicates that pre-existing risk neutral research is a special case of this paper under symmetrical information, this research of considering risk attitude is extension of pre-existing research. We confirm these through example simulation lastly.This paper hopes that it can provide effective theory reference frame for supply chain enterprises when they negotiate with each other and control quality risk.