The Research About The Risk Control Of The Joint-guarantee Loans In The Small And Medium Enterprises

In china, a lot of small and medium enterprises, SMEs for short, have high financial need, but with no credit, no guarantee nor any other collateral, they can hardly get any loan from any formal financial institutions such as banks. So for long terms, the small and medium enterprises have been faced with financing bottlenecks. Then the joint guarantee loan come up, with its no need for guarantee nor collateral, it brings breakthrough to the SMEs financial problems. However, the unlimited liability among the group of the joint-guarantee loan system increases the burden of the SMEs, the implied default risk can not be ignored. How to do a good job in risk control of the joint guarantee loan for the small and medium enterprises has become the main content of this paper.In this paper, we choose to combine theoretical analysis with case analysis as our research methods. In the theoretical analysis section, this paper attempts to establish a game model of a simple two-member to study the default and perform incentives of the joint guarantee loan. The relationship between the default or group punishment and the amount of default are key determinants of the optimal equilibrium joint-guarantee body decision-making. That is to say, if default and group punishment were greater than the default amount and default penalty increases with the default amount, it will encourage the joint-guarantee body members eventually choosing to perform, otherwise it will deviate, triggering default risk. In case analysis section, we use comparative case analysis. First, we analyzed actual cases of Ali Baba the network joint-guarantee loans with the multi-enterprise joint-guarantee loans in Zhejiang. We focused on analyzing motivating factor for all aspects of risk implied, which proposed the corresponding preventive measures, in order to strengthen the control of default risk in joint-guarantee loans. Then find the differences between the risk controls of each joint-guarantee loans, in order to summarize some risk control measures, so that we provide some advice and help for risk control of joint-guarantee loans modes in SMEs financing application.Through theoretical analysis and case analysis, from the four basic means of risk control-risk avoidance, loss control, risk transfer, risk retention-we start to analyze the risk control measures. Our basic viewpoints are to improve the information disclosure, to increase the default punishment, to strict the enterprises screening system, to approve loan amount prudentially and to establish a risk fund to control the joint-guarantee loans default risk. We solve the adverse selection and moral hazard arising from asymmetric information by improving the information disclosure; we increase the default punishment to increase the cost of joint-guarantee loans default; we strict the enterprises screening system to eliminate the higher risk enterprise from the source to fulfill risk aversion; we approved loan amount prudentially to reduce the risk of cumulative default risk transfer process to achieve loss control purposes; at last but not the least, we establish a risk fund as a form of risk retention, to reduce the impact of the loss to the financing institutions when risk occurs.The innovation of this paper is the combination of theoretical analysis and case studies, especially in case selecting. We choose the most innovated joint-guarantee loans financing mode-the Ali Baba network joint-guarantee loans case, as well as the nowadays popular topic-runaway tide of the private enterprises in Wenzhou-as background we discussed the quite typical multi-enterprises joint-guarantee loans in Zhejiang. The limitations and shortcomings in this paper are the lack of expansion and quantitative analysis of the theoretical model. In any case, we hope that, through our analysis we expect provide a little help to the risk control of the joint-guarantee loans for SMEs. We hope that in the future, the joint-guarantee loans mode as a new financing model for SMEs, will grow with the SMEs together, to play a more active role in the field of SME financing.