| State-owned enterprises are the backbone of the national economy, the reform process also reflects the change of our economic system to some extent. As a kind of special social resources, executives play an important part in the reformation and development of state-owned enterprises. In order to arouse executives’ enthusiasm and improve the state-owned enterprises’ competitiveness, it is necessary for us to make executive compensation distribution system in the state-owned enterprise perfect in further. For a long time, state-owned enterprise executives’ salary isn’t consistent with their labor input seriously, compared with foreign countries’ CEO remuneration level. An emerging problem is social inequitable distribution, especially after the global financial crisis, there is no doubt that executives’ compensation in our countries doesn’t match their performance contributions. Quite a few managers of state-owned enterprises have been still well-paid when a decline in corporate performance ever since Ma Mingzhe, the chairman of Ping An Insurance got RMB60million annual salary in2007. So the rationality and fairness of executive compensation distribution system is questioned by people from all walks of life. Governmental compensation control is the usual method to solve this problem, but which results in other potential compensation, such as non-pecuniary compensation. Therefore, it is quite worthy of designing executive compensation distribution system which is scientific and reasonable. In a word, the system should ensure managers exert their potential capability, and achieve internal equity and external equity as well. This research has been completed to promote the long-term development of state-owned enterprises in the construction process of our harmonious society.In this thesis,"fairness and efficiency" is selected as the breakthrough point, various techniques are also adopted to study the executive compensation distribution system in state-owned enterprise. For instance, literature research method, formal logic method, empirical analysis method and normative research method. The thesis consists of six sections, these are as follows. To begin with, we will provide a brief background on the manager remuneration, that is the unfair income distribution has been existed which results from executives enjoy fat salary especially for financial industry. Then, global governments spare no effort to set a series of laws to relief executive compensation distribution. A research plan is followed by analyzing the current researches at home and abroad. In the theoretical study section, the second chapter explains certain important concepts and theory used respectively, which is the basis for full text. The third chapter mainly introduces the interdisciplinary research method and constructs a concept model of impartial compensation distribution. It is based on the perspective of economics and management to seek a combination research between justice and compensation distribution. This will provide a way to discuss compensation distribution of state-owned enterprise systematically. In the next section, the fourth chapter and the fifth chapter are the core part of the full text, which focus on analyzing fair procedure in the impartial compensation distribution model. Specifically speaking, the former shows experimental studies for discussing the present situation of state-owned enterprise executive compensation distribution, which explores the result justice in practice. This part not only briefly surveys three aspects in income distribution, such as compensation distribution level, compensation distribution structure and compensation distribution differences, but also devotes to analyze the match degree between executives’compensation and their contributions aiming at illustrating the compensation distribution effects. Moreover, this section also puts forward a fair compensation distribution program due to state-owned enterprise managers from aspect of normative research. Some important issues in improving the compensation distribution program are discussed. A full consideration is given to distinguish different types of enterprises, these are public-welfare state-owned enterprises, monopoly state-owned enterprises and competitive state-owned enterprises. As a result, the thesis establishes the performance evaluation index system and arranges compensation structure respectively, in order to answer procedural justice in theory.After the analysis in the sections above, it comes up the conclusions in the sixth section as follows:Firstly, factors such as self-interest preference and fair preference are introduced in the FS model, so that it draws a conclusion that the incentive cost under fair preference is lower and more incentive than that under self-interest preference when the information is asymmetric. It is apparent that the fairness is an important factor that affects compensation distribution which makes a theoretical basis for the combination between fairness and compensation distribution. Secondly, the idea such as managers’contribution primarily decides the payment is supported in full text. Specifically, an excessive invest model based on net profit is applied to measure the contribution of executives and explore the compensation distribution effects in different kinds of state-owned enterprises. It is found in the research that there exists a positive correlation between executives’ compensation and their contributions in both public-welfare state-owned enterprises and competitive state-owned enterprises, which lays the foundation to figure out managers’ salary by their contributions. Thirdly, compensation distribution procedures should be separately designed according to various types of state-owned enterprises. With regard to public-welfare state-owned enterprises, elements such as policy orientation and social contributions should be introduced in the performance evaluation, and executives should get the annual salary as well as civil servants. What’s more, manager remuneration should contain base salary, allowance and pension. Monopoly state-owned enterprises should pay more attention on human capital and eco-environment factors, and bring in risk income which is consistent with manager’s performance. Meanwhile, the proportion of shareholding can be reduced to raise the level of explicit salary and strengthen the remuneration stimulus mechanism. Market competition and product innovation are chosen to evaluate managers’ performance contributions in competitive state-owned enterprises and the market-oriented compensation system are suitable to be applied in practice. Finally, we provide several suggestions to executives and supervisors that making governance structure perfect, improving allocation institution and strengthening incentive mechanism are indispensable for our state-owned enterprises.The innovation of this thesis covers three aspects:Firstly, fair compensation distribution is discussed to increase the operation efficiency of our state-owned enterprises. Secondly, this thesis builds an impartial compensation distribution model of economic fairness and social fairness from theoretical aspect. At the same time, it is considered that the managers’ contribution is the chief variable to study compensation distribution effects because compensation difference is not equal to the unfairness of payment in fact. Last but not least, executives’ compensation distribution programs according to three types of enterprises are proposed. Thirdly, multidisciplinary and multilevel methods are put into use. To be honest, there may be some shortages in this research, so that more work will have to be done in the future. |
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