Evolutionary Game Analysis Of Enterprise Group Management

With the development of information&knowledge economy and the deepening of economic globalization, Chinese businesses are facing increasingly competitive pressure from the world. Construction of large enterprise groups is becoming a trend. At the same time, with the increase of mergers and acquisitions, and the further expansion of multinational corporations, governance problem brought by the complexity of the enterprise groups is urgent to be solved. Corporate governance should span a single corporate governance boundary, to expand enterprise dimensions, implementation from "Corporate "governance to "group" governance breakthrough.Study of the enterprise governance based on the group theory, corporate governance theory, information economics, evolutionary game theory and other areas of multi-disciplinary comprehensive cross foundation, to enterprise group governance issues, focusing on the parent-subsidiary corporate governance of enterprise groups and enterprise collaborative governance. Based on the participants’bounded rationality, and fully considered the influence of the dynamic nature of governance and its initiative, the paper established evolutionary game analysis model to study the interactive mechanism of company’s strategy choice, analyze evolution path and the important factors affecting the evolution stability of the system. Enrich and perfect the corporate governance theory, offering a new thinking to resolve the corporate governance problem. Through theoretical research, evolutionary game theory analysis and case study, the main conclusions are as follows:(1) Enterprise group governance based on corporate governance, but also from the general corporate governance, its governance across corporate boundaries. The goal of corporate governance is to establish a reasonable balance mechanism in the conflict, making the group’s overall benefit maximization, produce the integral advantage of the group.(2) Enterprise group game system existed evolutionary stable strategy in3cases, but there is no optimal stable strategy. The strategy choices depend on each other’s strategy selection probability, the final equilibrium state depends on the parent company learning adjustment speed. The relationship between company and its subsidiary treatment should focus on two aspects:one is management control, the other is encouraging. From the management control and incentive perspective, enterprise group should design an effective long-term incentive and constraint mechanism, balance the parent-subsidiary control and autonomy, prompted the subsidiary choose the most favorable action of the parent company from their own interests to, promote the company to establish good relations of mutual trust and benefit.(3) The affiliated company’s initial location in the zone of evolutionary game strategy decided the evolution path and the stability of the system. The adjustment of the initial state’s parameters can increase probability of taking the reciprocal behavior between the companies, and their collaborative behavior is controllable and incentive. Collaboration revenue increment and its distribution, cooperation cost and the extra income of the opportunistic behavior company are the main factors that influence the evolution path of game system and the evolution stability of the system. The optimal cooperative income allocation proportion p is existed, making the member enterprises are taking reciprocity behavior strategy’s probability maximization. By constantly improving the incentive and restraint mechanisms and controlling collaborative elements can promote the establishment and stability of collaborative relationship in enterprise group, Achieving the collaborative governance of enterprise groups and playing overall superiority of enterprise groups.