Research On Compensation Contract Model Of High-tech Enterprise In The Double Incentive Conditions

Currently, the high-tech industry has evolved to become the mainstay of the force topromote world economic development and progress. The major driving force to promote thehigh-tech boom is knowledge, technology and innovation management, which means thesource of innovation and the main body has a wealth of knowledge and creativity of people.Therefore, the senior management as the special resources of the high-tech enterprises hasplayed a pivotal role in the growth of the enterprise. The theory of modern enterprise viewthat the enterprise is essentially a series of incomplete contract Commonwealth. Due to theasymmetry of information, and antagonistic conflicts of goals contrary to the interests and therisks and responsibilities mismatch between shareholders and executives, principal-agentproblem is very prominent in high-tech enterprise. Therefore, the shareholders mustconstantly improve the corporate governance mechanism, effective incentive to executives.The well-designed compensation contract is an effective means to coordinate principal-agentconflict between corporate shareholders and executives. This paper takes the high-techenterprise senior management personnel as the research object, the effectiveness andsuperiority of the dual incentive conditions of compensation contract as the main target,through the study of the moral risk and reward incentive mechanism, incentive contract modelof single and double excitation conditions were established. Compensation incentive of theproxy process is solved in a double incentive contract. Useful help and inspiration is providedfor the operation and management of high-tech enterprises.Firstly, based on the Mirrlees and Holmstrom model and theoretical framework, theability of corporate executives is introduced to the outputs, the enterprise value of the costfunction. Considering corporate executives own reputation, prestige and other factors onimpact of the enterprise value, the compensation contract model under the single-anddual-excitation conditions is created. In the incentive contract, assuming a motivating waycash or equity to participate, the remuneration incentives problems of corporate executives isanalyzed. In the dual incentive contract, the cash share and equity share two kinds of incentivetools at the same time introduced into the compensation contract incentive model, theproblems related to business executives with the optimal effort level, the optimal paymentratio are discussed. Secondly, through the comparison of the three contract model thepayment proportion, the double incentive contract is analyzed to alleviate the shortage offunds for high-tech enterprises and the sharing of the pressure on corporate executives risk bidirectional. And three contract model of corporate executives under the conditions of thedegree and the enterprise value contribution rate is compared and analyzed to use numericalsimulation. the important advantage of the dual incentive way is discussed in improvingcorporate executives effort level and enhancing corporate earnings play.