The Governance Mechanism Design And Simulation On E-commerce Trust Based On Bilateral Regulation

Trust cris is has always been the great bottleneck to E-bus iness developing. Withthe rapid deve lopme nt of E-commerce in recent years, the amount of networkcomp la ining d isputes and frauds increased day by day.This makes trust cris is moreserious and be the biggest threat to electronic business deve loping.Currently, all e-commerce platforms ha ve built trust governance mecha nis mswhich centered on improving sellers trust degree to protect buyers interest andincrease the success rate of deals. This, of course, has reduced the opportunisticbehaviors of se llers and the trade risk of buyers effective ly. However, new proble mscome up such as malic io us bad reviews and freque nt returns. This b uyer is wiser thanseller strange circ le appears freque ntly and harms se llers interest and increases thedispute between traders a lot. So how to design a more effective trust mechanis m tosolve the above proble m has been the present burning question.This thes is first started from the description of the two governing environment——Global Information Asymmetry and Unilateral Sellers Regulation of presentE-bus iness trust and built a trust Dyna mic Game model between traders under theabove enviro nment and by solving a nd analyzing this mode l, pointed out thegoverning need of the current E-commerce.Then, it ra ised a new E-commerce trust mechanis m fro m the two points ofchanging the Game Equilibrium result and decreasing the information asymmetrydegree whic h consists of b ilateral trust ma nage ment, dyna mic correlatio n of nodestrust, different providing method of trust information for buyers and sellers threeaspects. This paper also designed detailed imp le mentation rules includ ing that bothbuyers and sellers sho uld authe nticated by the ir real-name a nd should both bepunis hed whe n cheat, any partic ipant s trust degree should cons ider the trust of thetrad ing partner, time value, the d ifferent we ight between d irect and indirectexperience, sellers should be reminded whe n trader s trust degree is low enough et al.After that, an E-business simulation trading platform was built based on the trustmecha nis m suggested above which combines the two most serio us pheno mena ofpresent E-business——Credit Speculation and Online Touch Porcelain to verifythe effectiveness of the above mecha nis m. The s imulatio n result showed that: as thenumber of trade times increases under the above trust mecha nis m,1. honest buyers can be separated out fro m dis honest buyers by lower the latter s trust degree;2. theinflue nce to seller s trust caused by Credit Speculation and Touch Porcelain can begradually e liminated and sellers trust degree can converge to a norma l state.