Satisfaction Research On Dividend Policy Of The Listed Company

In our country, managers high salary in state-owned enterprise and the gap betweenemployees at the grass-roots and executives, which have the serious influence on theincentive effect. Executive administrative organizational system and wage rigidity make theexecutive salaries not to response to corporate performances, raising all the worker’saverage income in the state-owned enterprises. The way that part state-owned enterpriseseven pray for national subsidies or raise the price on the monopoly resources, onlysupplying provide profitable books rather than the deficit for profit violates the basiceconomic laws. When the general corporation check the branch or subsidiary profitindexes, the unreasonable division of the index range, the single evaluation indexes and thenext indexes based on the budget law in the state-owned enterprises in our country, lead tomany subsidiary executives deliberately meet profit targets and limit the subsidiary orbranch’s decisions in the management. The executives can control costs only according tothe basic strategy in order to increase profit targets, doesn’t make the basic incentive effect.The problem in the front of China’s state-owned enterprises is that Low level of pay, thedislocation of the compensation and adjustment mechanism, the lack of long-term incentive,the long-standing phenomenon of insider control and the unclear option incentive objectmake that The profits of state-owned enterprises in China is largely derived from thespecial status and in the possession of resources, rather than form the real "Schumpeterrent". The insufficient of the state-owned enterprise managers’ compensation incentive,therefore, has become a bottleneck restricting the development of state-owned enterprises.For the sake of changing the insufficient of executive incentive in state-owned enterprises,monopoly state-owned enterprises should be increase the proportion in profit, establish andimprove the compensation committee, expand the proportion of executives of state-ownedenterprises to pay disclosure and transparency. The relative performance evaluation methodand the state-owned capital evaluation methods are based on key performance indicators(KPI) to establish performance evaluation method, the difference is that the former isselected industry best enterprise or process as a benchmark, and the latter is based on thebalanced scorecard method, setting up a comprehensive financial indicators and non-financial indicators of evaluation system to evaluate business performance. Therelative performance evaluation avoid the budget law of the high cost and the unnecessaryquestion the influence of the uncertainty economic operation in the next time,and blow tothe senior managers trying to adopt the methods of virtual and low budget to promote theirfuture performance by the average comprehensive indicator in the same period in the sameindustry or market. The relative performance evaluation make up for the disadvantage ofthe lack of evidence in the absolute performance evaluation, the lateral comparison and thestrong subjectivity. The method with the aid of reference or reference standard to filternoise can greatly increase the accuracy of evaluation and provide the reasonablesuggestions for our country setting the executive compensation policies.