Research On Quality Control Contract In Supply Chain With Different Information Structure

With the development of economic globalization, supply chain management has been animportant management model of modern enterprises. Quality is the soul of product, but also thecompetitiveness of enterprises, so supply chain quality management takes important position insupply chain management. Due to saving the cost and other reasons, enterprises may do shoddy workand use inferior material that lead to quality problem increasing. And people pay more and moreattention to quality control.First of all, this paper establishes two-stage game models of a neutral supplier and a neutralmanufacture. Study the supply chain decision-marking problem which manufacturer is a leader underthe symmetric information in two kind cases. The one case is that the demand is affected by thequality of supplier products.The other case is that the demand is affected by the quality of supplierproducts and marketing quality. By comparing the supply chain profit and quality decision under thetwo kind cases, supply chain can increase market demand and improve the production quality level byinvesting sales quality. Due to the supply chain members make decision from their own interests, willresult in “double marginal benefit”. In order to eliminate the “double marginal benefit”, the paperdesigns cost allocation and revenue sharing contract models to realize the Pareto improvement ofsupply chain members.Secondly, when the demand is affected by the quality of supplier products,and the demand isaffected by the quality of supplier products and marketing quality,study the supply chain how tomake decision when the supplier is the a leader in supply chain. In order to eliminate the “doublemarginal benefit”, the paper designs cost allocation and revenue sharing contract models to realize thePareto improvement of supply chain members. It concludes that by accepted the cost allocation andrevenue sharing contract, the manufacture can get more profit by paying more cost of sale quality.Finally, the asymmetric information is introduced into the two-stage supply chain decision model,and built manufacture dominant model and supplier dominant model. Using principle-agent theoryand optimal control theory, the paper designs the linear incentive contract and nonlinear wholesaleprice contract to reduce the problem of moral hazard.