Control Rights Of Actual Controller, Executive Equity Incentive And Corporate Performance

Since the equity division reform completed basically by the end of2005, the equityincentive came into effect in the true sense in our country. On January1,2006, our countrypromulgated “the listed company equity incentive management approach”, then more and morelisted companies began to implement equity incentive plan, and the research about equityincentive has become a social hot spot. Based on the above perspective, this article selects5155values of the listed companies in the cities of Shanghai and Shenzhen (A shares) from2006to2011. Using multiple linear regressions and empirical analysis, this paper analyzes the relation ofactual controllers control，executive equity incentive and corporate performance，then discussesthe equity incentive effect in the enterprises of different natures.Based on the review and study of the previous scholars both at home and abroad, from theperspective of control allocation，with the method of combining theoretical analysis and practicalresearch, this paper discusses the impact of the actual controllers control rights on the equityincentive. Analysis results show that: first, listed company executives shareholding ratio is low,"a single big" phenomenon is outstanding, and differences for enterprise property in our country;Second, listed company executives shareholding, actual controllers control rights industry,annual and corporate property differences in our country; Third, listed company executivesshareholding is linear positive correlation with corporate performance, control rights of actualcontrollers is linear positive correlation with corporate performance, actual controllers controlrights significant conflict with company executives shareholding in our country; Fourth,compared with the state-owned enterprises, the conflicts between actual controller control rightsand executive equity incentive are more significant in non-state-owned enterprises.