Low-cost Signal Analysis In 1972 To Ease The Process Of Sino-US - 1969

Chinese and American leaders faced a number of significant foreignpolicy problems arising from the change of international background,especially the Soviet threat. While perceiving each other as decreasingmenacing, they thus turned to each other in order to resolve the respectivepolicy dilemma. But before relations could improve, suspicious had to beallayed and common had to be established. Beijing and Washington thereforespent1969-1972signaling their respective policies and intentions. HenryKissinger’s secret July1971visit to Beijing confirmed the foundation for aSino-American Summit, leading to the Shanghai Communiqué and theestablishment of liaison office. The compromise solution enabled Beijing andWashington to break through twenty years of mistrust to terminate costly andcounterproductive hostility. This in itself was a major accomplishment ofhistoric proportion.Realism theory holds the idea that the change of international powerstructure will automatically lead to the transformation of national policy andinternational relations, while ignores the process of policy-adjustment per se.This thesis emphasizes that not only the advantageous international is neededfor two countries to turn from hostility to détente, but also the prudentrapprochement foreign policy is essential. Among the steps to realize détente,signaling is a momentous method. The Sino-American detente took placefrom1969-1972represents an important historical example of conflictreduction that occurred because of1) a number of significant changes in theinternational system, and2) because of the success of American initiatives andbilateral signaling. This study of the signaling that went on between the twoactors is an attempt to explore the importance and influences of costlesssignals on the basis of a careful and rigorous examination of the factors thatled the United States and The People’s Republic of China to negotiate to seekdetente from1969-1972. In brief, the study is aim to show how and why thedetente occurred but with special emphasis on the costless-signaling strategyboth sides applied.The conclusion indicates that during the tension reduction andde-escalation period of1969-1972, the use of costless signals contribute to thedetente between the United States and the People’s Republic of China sincecostless signals can not only demonstrate the sender’s kind intention but alsoavoid the considerable risks it would took from both domestic and abroadbecause of the twenty-years’ hostility between the two countries. Theapplication of the costless created a climate for negotiation which undoubtedly hastened the detente because it helped overcome the resistance in emotionaland psychological level, thereby speeding the process. Moreover, sincesending the costless signals could avoid the risk of domestic and foreignopposition, the detente would quickly restart even through it came acrossgreat obstacles, Cambodia Crisis alike.