The Effect Of Third-party Second-order Punishment/Reward On Punishment/Reward Norm And Cooperation Norm

Objective: Punishment and reward are considered to be effective means to maintain cooperationnorm. They partly solve the public goods dilemma. At the meantime, however, punishment andreward bring in the instrumental dilemma or second-order public goods problem. In order toseeking an effective means to further solve this problem, we propose third-party second-orderpunishment/reward based on the theory of meta-norm and the theory of strong reciprocity.Suppose that third-party second-order punishment/reward have positive effects onpunishment/reward norm and cooperation norm in public goods game.Methods: Using repeated public goods games as the basic framework of experiment, our studyjointly adopt within-subjects design and between-subjects design to explore The effect ofthird-party second-order punishment/reward on punishment/reward norm and cooperation norm.Results:(1) Most subjects impose third-party second-order punishment/rewards, but the percentage ofsubjects who never imposed third-party second-order punishment/rewards is more than thepercentage of subjects who never imposed second-party first-order punishment/rewards.Moreover, the usage frequency and imposing cost of third-party second-orderpunishment/reward is less than the usage frequency and imposing cost of second-party first-orderpunishment/rewards.(2) when the opportunity for third-party second-order punishment/reward exist, compared withnot exist, second-party first-order punishment/rewards becomes more reasonable and more strictfor reward and punishment.(3) There is no difference both on cooperation level and cooperation consistency between thesituation third-party second-order punishment/reward exists and not exists.(4) The usage frequency of third-party second-order reward is more than the usage frequency of third-party second-order punishment; the imposing cost of third-party second-order reward ismore than the imposing cost of third-party second-order punishment. Besides, some subjectsback up first-order rewarders by offering second-order rewards, and oppose first-order punishersby offering second-order punishments.Conclusion:(1) Third-party second-order punishment/reward exist. But its implementation willingness is lessthan second-party first-order punishment/reward’s.(2) Third-party second-order punishment/reward have positive effects on punishment/rewardnorm；(3) Third-party second-order punishment/reward do not get effect instantly on cooperation normin public goods game.(4) Higher-order rewards and punishments appear as asymmetry as well. Third party is inclinedto use reward than punishment.