Game Strategy Simulations Of Climate Change Negotiation Between The United States And China

Extreme meteorological disasters caused by global warming and the boomingtrend of global greenhouse gas emission have alerted human beings to the necessityand urgency of pushing forward the negotiation and implementation of reduction. Thedifferences of viewpoints and climate negotiation strategies among the global leadingemitters, especially between the United States and China, are the major factorsinfluencing the process of climate negotiation in the future. Therefore, our research putforward a theoretical game model to analyze and simulate the dynamic game strategiesbetween the United States and China. The positive, negative and spillover effects ofclimate change investment on the utility of each negotiator are distinguished andinvolved into our theoretical model together with the game theory. Simulations for thedynamic strategic game model are carried out based on the theoretical model. Both therobustness of our conclusions and deep policy implications are also analyzed withsensitivity tests.Simulation results indicate that the lack of effective guarantee mechanism willlead to the failure of cooperation between the United States and China and the missingof2℃global warming control target. Although dynamic game model proves thatthere is still room of Parato improvement by cooperation, the existence of first-moverdisadvantage and the differences of cooperative motivations are the principal causesfor the cooperation failure. Simulations results further emphasize the necessity ofeffective mechanisms such as technical and capital assistance for the realization ofintergovernmental cooperation, especially for the participation of emerging countries.Sensitivity analyses results not only further prove the conclusions of simulations, butalso offer China suggestions for the enhancement of negotiation power, including thereadjustment of industrial structure and strengthening of economy’s resistance toclimate fluctuation. Meantime, sensitivity analyses results also suggest that if theeconomic growth of China becomes slower and the social risk preference together withtime discounting rate become higher in the future, the optimal and equalizedinvestment for China should be adjusted downwards optimally. Apart from simulations together with sensitivity analyses of the theoretical gamestrategy model between the United States and China, this study also offers a newperspective for the effectiveness evaluation of global climate change policies and theenhancement of China’s negotiation skills.