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Discussion Of The Third-type Agent Cost In The State-owned Monopoly Enterprises

Posted on:2014-02-05Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H LaiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2249330398991257Subject:Accounting
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Beijing Times reported on March12,2012that on March9,2012, when theGuizhou Maotai Brewery launched the global conference of Maotai of Jacky Chan, apresent journalist asked the executives of Maotai about the proposal of prohibition ofMaotai in Three public consumption, Liu Zili, the General Manager of Maotai, reactedfiercely, asking a question in reply, Prohibiting Maotai in Three public consumption?Then would you please tell me, what else should be drunk for three publicconsumption? As our secretary of a provincial Party committee said, if Maotaiprohibited in three public consumption, to drink Lafite instead? Instantly the replydrew widespread attention, and the three public consumption came into the spotlight.Not come single but in pairs, on April12,2011a post appeared in Forum of Tianyaexposed several copies of invoices showing that Guangdong branch of Sinopecpurchased expensive wines such as Lafite. It turned out that it was arranged by LuGuangyu, who was the General Manager at that time for personal usage, totaling1.589million. Once it was exposed, it triggered enormously negative effect, and wascondemned seriously. In2010, there was a series of cases of corruption, some topmanagers was culled in some branched of PetroChina. Once, the list of corruption wasquite popular in public.Lu Guangyu spent millions for private benefit, which was a solstice of on-dutyconsumption, which actually was not an exception. What else exist while not found outyet? Further, with the reformation and development, state-owned corporations,especially central enterprises, the profitability increases, and we want to know how theprofit was disposed.What is the reason for this? In fact, a well-developed supervision system havealready been established in our nation, however the achievements are not satisfactory.The existence of high wage and high welfare in state-owned monopoly enterprises, andthe endless emergence of illegal behavior, what is the cause lying beneath? Maybe wecan get enlightened from the exploration of Third type of agency costs of state-ownedmonopoly enterprises.In the modern enterprise system, between the ultimate investor and the Ultimateproperty users, there exist Third type of principal-agent relationship, namely theprincipal-agent relationship between different levels of managers and operators. Thirdtype principal-agent costs mainly includes the inspection fee of the subordinates, theloss in value due to the shirking problems of the subordinates、excessive pay of the subordinates、the losses in value due to the moral hazard and adverse selection、stimulant fee for the subordinates and so on. From the perspective of reality, theexcessively high of third type principal-agent costs is a fact that cannot be denied, andbecomes an obstruction for the development of state-owned monopoly enterprises.Hence, exploration of the Third type principal-agent costs is of great importance to theachievement of the overall goal of the state-owned monopoly enterprises.The sense of the paper includes:(1) practical significance:①through theconcrete measurement, provide some data backup for the development of the systemmitigating the principal-agent problem;②aiming at providing some suggestions for thethird type principal-agent costs;③promoting the practice usage of relating theoryabout principal-agent costs.(2) theoretical significance:①aiming at providing ageneral framework for the exploration of the third type principal-agent costs of thestate-owned monopoly enterprises;②enriching the literature relating the third typeprincipal-agent theory;③enriching the theory of financial regulation of thestate-owned monopoly enterprises.The paper adopts normative research method. The paper goes in the logic train ofraising a question, analyzing the problem and resolving the problem. And use Inductiveanalysis properly, method of comparative analysis, analyzing and exploring the thirdtype principal-agent costs. The paper starts from the general introduction ofprincipal-agent relationship and agency costs, direct at the status quo.existing problemsand reasons of the third type principal-agent costs, and put forwards concrete measures.Besides the introduction, the paper extends5chapters to explore the third type ofprincipal-agent. Chapter1develops the general theoretical introduction of the Thirdtype principal-agent of state-owned monopoly enterprises, which tells the concept ofstate-owned monopoly enterprises and the third type principal-agent relationship andthe relationship of them. Chapter2gives an introduction of the analysis of the problem,including the basic phenomenon description, the analysis the existing problems,numeral measurement, and analysis of the reason. Chapter3is about discussing howforeign countries take into control the third type principal-agent cost, including USA、France、Japan and UK. Chapter4put forwards the concrete measures to mitigate theproblem.
Keywords/Search Tags:State-owned Monopoly Enterprises, the Third-Type Agency Cost, the Measurement of Agency Cost
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