The Empirical Research On The Impact Of Ultimate Control Rights And Deviate On The Inefficient Investment Of Chain’s Listed Companies

Investment behavior is the important foundation of the company’s developmentand growth. It directly affects the company’s financial decision and dividends, indirectlyaffects macroeconomic running smoothly. However the inefficient investment behaviors,containing over-investment and under-investment, will affect the company’s normaldevelopment and lead to waste of resources. The traditional corporate governance theory isbased on the principal-agent relationship between ownership and manager-entrusted anddispersed ownership. However lots of researches suggest that companies in our countryhave highly centralized equity structure and have the ultimate controlling shareholder.Ultimate controlling shareholder can hold control rights exceed their cash flow rights.The deviation of the two rights would drive ultimate controlling shareholder to obtainnumerous private benefits through violating minority shareholders’ benefits. So, researchon the effect of the separation coeffcient of control rights and cash flow rights oninvestment efficiency has important practical meanings.In order to analyze the influence of ultimate control, shareholders’ cash flow rightsand control rights on the performance of investment efficiency. This paper establishes anexpected investment model based on the agency theory, asymmetric information theory. Iundertake a study on data of listed companies in China, by using the correlation test,descriptive analysis and multiple regression analysis method.Research results indicatethat the deviate of listed companies and over-investment in a significant degree ofpositive correlation, but has some inhibition effects on under-investment. The controlright has a significant positive correlation both on over-investment and under-investment.According to the nature of the equity, the study found in the private control of publiccompany, the deviate has a significant adverse impact on inefficient investment; in localstate-owned listed company, the deviate of two rights only has significant effect onover-investment and on under-investment is not significant. In the central-listed companies,the deviate of the two rights has no significant both on over-investment andunder-investment, and has some inhibition effects on investment inefficiency, indicatingthe deviate of listed companies may also be a certain protection mechanisms.