A Game Analysis On The Accounting Information Publication Of The State-owned Holding Company

The state-owned holding company is not only a major force in this stage of China’seconomic and social development, but also an important part of the state-owned economy.However, it is undeniable that, China’s state-owned holding company widespread lack ofdisclosure of accounting information as well as incomplete structural distortion of a seriousnature, affect not only their own day-to-day operations and equity financing for thedevelopment of state-holding enterprises and also to some extent interfere with our overalleconomic operation.In order to effectively address these problems, this paper carried out innovativeresearch methods, the introduction of game theory and information economics to theproblem of the quality of accounting information and discussed from the point of view ofcorporate governance. According to game theory, combined with state-owned holdinglisted companies accounting information disclosure, disclosure obligations to fulfill withthe opposite counterfeiters gain asymmetry, ineffective when income is large, thedisclosure of accounting information, and when the change of the corresponding paymentfunction to regulate this behavior, it is highly probable that the expected benefit to reduceon the disclosure of accounting information of listed companies, in order to effectivelyrestrain its neglect of accounting information disclosure. Of course, this regulationconstraint lies not only in the accounting staff, also lies in the joint efforts of the publicoversight and directors of listed companies layer, business layer, including all the main.Thus, disclosure of accounting information to establish reasonable corporate governance isthe key to solving this problem。In this paper, firstly define the concept of corporate governance and informationdisclosure system. Then use the contract theory and corporate agency theory to describethe theoretical origins of corporate governance and information disclosure’s interaction relationship. In theory, improve the corporate governance structure of the informationdisclosed importance. And description of the application of game theory in accountinginformation disclosed.Secondly, through the establishment of the model of prisoner’s dilemma，we canprove operators and accounting personnel, between operators with shareholders, tomaximize their own interests will eventually neither true disclosure of the outcome of thegame. Through establishing the model of ‘clever pig game’, we proved true accountinginformation demand subject is "absence" in fact, the state-owned shareholders and otherstakeholders in many times after the game will choose unreal disclosure strategies; finallyto prove from the actual situation of owner absence, restricted the impartiality andindependence of CPA audit. Therefore must be based on perfect property right system, totake measures to strengthen supervision, the CPA’s punishment.Thirdly, the introduction of the “Wuliangye” fraud case, combined with the first fewchapters of theory and game model to analyze the cause of the false from the perspective ofcorporate governance.Finally, with the combination of the model analysis, the paper argues that China onlytake comprehensive measures to fundamentally solve the problem of accounting quality.First of all, increase the penalties for fraud operators and improve the incentives foroperators; Secondly, optimize the equity structure, carries on the reduction of state-ownedshares; Thirdly, improve the system of independent directors; Finally, to strengthenexternal supervision were obtained comprehensive coordination of external informationregulatory and internal governance.