The Game Between Shareholders And Operators About Accounting Information

In recent years, scandals of accounting in domestic and international capital marketsemerge in a large amount. With the development of China’s economy, the problem ofaccounting fraud is increasingly serious and achieved more concern in community. ThePrincipal-agent Relationship between shareholders and operator is the most basic andimportant in a company.：the operator is the virtual accounting behavior subject, and on theother hand, considering the maximization of their own interests, the shareholders have theincentives to actively influence the operator’s choice of accounting policies by means of “voteby hands” or “vote by feet”. In addition, the differences of shareholding structure betweencompanies cause different exercise method of shareholders and alter the comparisonrelationship between operator and shareholders, and it finally influence the quality ofaccounting information. So it’s significant to discuss the game relationship betweenshareholders and operators about accounting information according to the types ofshareholding structure.This paper is based on the principal-agent relationship theory and the signaling theory.By means of the game analysis, the paper discuss how the shareholders and operatorsinfluence the accounting information, then put forward effective suggestions.Firstly, thedomestic and foreign research achievements in the relevant issues are introduced. Secondly,the basis of the relationship between shareholders and operators is presented. Thirdly, thegame models about the reliability and the adequacy of accounting information are madeaccording to the shareholding structure. The shareholding structure includes dispersingshareholding, balance shareholding and concentrating shareholding. Lasting, according to thegame results, suggestions for improving accounting information are put forward.