A Study On Trusteeship Management Patterns And Their Performance---a Case Study On HL Company

Along with the development of control right market in China, more and more companies hope to optimize their governance structure and improve operating performance by transfer of control right which is one of assets reorganization. Recent researches indicate that operating performance can’t be improved continuously after control right have been transferred. But there are increasing events of control right transfer in China’s capital market. With the drastic finish of stock non-tradability reform, stocks come into the time of complete circulation; and control right market will develop largely:Therefore, this thesis consider that it is a practical significance to make theoretical and empirical research on the operating performance and its influence factors of operating performance of listed companies which transfer their control rights.This paper is based on the reality of China’s institutional background and the characteristics of the listed companies’ controlling-shareholders changing. Taking HL Company which has experienced control right transferring during may-august as research samples, adopting the method of the same industry matching comparison, taking the changing of board of supervisors after takeover as the beginning of this research, and choosing ROE as he benchmarks of measuring operating performance, the paper studied the takeover and its impact on the board of supervisors and operating performance.First, after control right transferring of state-controlled listed companies, the operating performance has been improved and the effect of control right transferring is efficient. But this improvement is decreasing gradually, which explicit that Chinese control right transferring has not changed the mechanisms of corporate governance and improve the operating performance completely.Second, takeover lead to the change of the board of supervisors and these changes are reflected in a series of features of the board of supervisors, such as the number of the supervisors reducing, the times of meeting hold by the board of supervisors increasing, and the replacement of the director of the board of supervisors, which explicit that the mechanism of takeover could promote the structure of corporate governance to perfect.Third, after control right transferring the changes of the board of supervisors made no difference in promoting operating-performance between the samples and their matching company. The times of meeting hold by the board of supervisors and the director of the board of supervisors have no impact on the corporate operating performance. Although the5-person board of supervisors’ listed companies’ operating performance are better than the3-listed companies’ in the short run, considering the weak position of the board of supervisors in today’s China, it can be concluded that the size of the board of supervisors can not impact the listed companies’ operating performance.The research results suggest that Chinese should further improve the market for corporate control, and reduce the intervention on corporate control right transferring, and strengthen the efficiency of the market mechanism to let the corporate control right market play its role freely on promoting the efficiency of corporate governance;Also, through legislation and enhancing the overall quality of supervisors, and introducing independent supervisors and incentive mechanism for supervisors, and other means to strengthen the role of the board of supervisors, and promote the corporate governance structure to perfect.