Study On Slotting Allowance And Regulation Of The Large Retailer

In the late20^thcentury,the retail industry has expanded scale with the improvedmarket concentration rates.Retailers with monopsony has become price-maker.withthe buyer power,retailers implement vertical restraints to supplier.The most ofaccomplished of vertical restraints is slotting allowance,such as “entry fee”“barcoding”“profit return”.Slotting allowance behavior caused the contradition betweensuppliers and retailers,which has attracted national attention.Regulation of fairtrading betwwen Retailer and Supplier by the Ministry of Commerce and otherministries in2006overhauled,but it has not achieved the expected effects inpractices.Based on the retailer with buy power,we analysis the effect of slottingallowance and put forth hisrecommendations by the ecomomic framework ofSCP-R.First of all,we analysis the revenue description of slotting allowance.We canfind that the large amount、multitude names、more modes and so on.And then,westudy the economic effect of three cases by three-stage dynamic game:withoutcharging slotting allowance、slotting allowance associated with sale（linear slottingallowance and differences of the slotting allowance）、slotting allowance associatedwithout sale.We can see that: charging the slotting allowance associated withoutsale will raise price; linear slotting allowance can reduce theprice,howere,improving the degree of the industrial concentration; differences ofthe slotting allowance can reduce the industrial concentration,resulting priceimproving.In other words,government regulations can not have any bias on eitherparts.At last,the government should enhance competitiveness of the retail industry.