The Research On Investment Efficiency Of Liaoning Province Listed Companies

The problem of efficiency is the core of the study in Management. Improving theefficiency is of great significance to the survival and development of enterprises. Withthe development of Chinese capital market, the number of listed corporation isincreasing and the efficiency of investment has become the focus of attention of allparties. The domestic and foreign scholars have conducted a lot of theoretical andempirical studies on the main factors influencing the investment efficiency ofenterprise but obtaining no consistent conclusion.The inconsistency may be due to ignorance of the system environment ofenterprises. Due to historical reasons, the development of regional economy is notbalanced in China. As a national production base for equipment manufacturingindustry, Liaoning Province, in recent years, has made great achievements. However,what is the level of investment efficiency of listed corporations in Liaoning province?It is necessary to be answered whether they can be improved or how to be improved.In this paper, with the start of agency theory and asymmetric information theory,the author, on the basis of the existing research results, selected the panel data of38listed corporations in Liaoning province from2003to2011.Firstly, the author madescriptive statistics to the investment spending of listed corporations in LiaoningProvince. Meanwhile, the author estimated the investment efficiency to sample firmswithin9years on the basis of Richardson model. Secondly, the author madetheoretical analysis and put forward research hypothesis. Finally, the hypotheses weretested empirically through multivariate regression model.The main conclusions of this paper are: inefficient investment of listedcorporations in Liaoning province is mainly manifested in the lack of investment;agency cost and financing constraints have significant influence on the efficiency ofinvestment, but the influence of the agency cost to the efficiency of investment ismuch more serious; agency cost had a significantly negative correlation withinvestment inefficiency. The empirical results support the hypothesis of "private cost" rather than the classic "private benefits of control" hypothesis; financing constraintsand underinvestment and overinvestment are correlated but not significantly, whichshowed that financing constraints listed corporations is not the main reason causinginefficient investment. Information disclosure has a significantly negative correlationwith investment efficiency, which proves that reducing the asymmetric informationcan improve the efficiency of investment; product market competition, investmentinefficiency and excessive are positively correlated, which shows that product marketcompetition can restrain the inefficient investment behavior; ownership structure canimprove the efficiency of investment, but it does not show positive governance effectsignificantly; low ownership in management fails to effectively reduce the agencyproblem between shareholders and management; notably, after distinguishing thebackground of enterprise property rights, underinvestment and overinvestmenttendency of state-owned listed corporation are much serious than those of nonstate-owned listed corporation, which explains the efficiency of investment instate-owned listed corporations is lower than non state-owned listed corporations.Finally, on the basis of the research results, the author puts forward relevantpolicy suggestions from two aspects to improve the external governance environmentand strengthen internal supervision, and points out the research inefficiency and theresearch direction in the latter study.