The Empirical Research On The Relationship Between Managerial Ownership Structure And Firm Performance Of Chinese Listed Companies

Because of the high degree of the separation of the right of management from the right of ownership, based on the principle of the hoggish economic men, the goals that bailers pursuit are not same with the goals that agents are chasing, and that results the principal-agent problem. In order to reduce the cost of the agent cost, the enterprise owners take a variety of incentive and restraint measures to make the behaviors of the managers would meet their own goals. Being as an important corporate governance mechanism to coordinate the agency problem between the enterprise owners and managers, managerial ownership system has received the attention from a great numbers of scholars from home and abroad. Since2005, with the development of the shareholder structure reform in China, the managerial ownership mechanism made a significant progress as an incentive measures, more and more companies began to adopt it. However, with the outbreak of the financial crisis, whether the astronomical salaries of managers are inadequate and the incentive mechanisms of managerial ownership are anamorphotic are being pushed to the cusp of public opinion. Therefore, whether the incentive systems of managerial ownership would give full play to the proper incentive effects in our country still needs to test in practice, this paper aims at providing a little theoretical basis for the benign development of the managerial ownership mechanism in our country through empirical analysis.First of all, this paper reviews the relevant literature on relationship between the managerial ownership structure and firm performance, compares the major differences and divergences between the different schools, analyses their causes. Then, the paper states the theoretical basis that relate to the proportion of managerial ownership and firm performance, such as the principal-agent theory, the human capital theory, the entrepreneur theory, trying to explain the necessity of managerial ownership in theory, then use the mathematical statistical method to describe the status of managerial ownership of China in2006-2010, finally we use the multiple regression analysis method to do an empirical test. The results of empirical research show that when the managerial ownership is within a certain range, there is a significant positive linear correlation between the proportion of managerial ownership and firm performance. When the managerial ownership is not in that range, the proportion of managerial ownership and corporate performance of listed companies in China presents a significant nonlinear relationship of the N-type.