Research On The Coordination Of Closed Loop Supply Chain Under Government Subsidies

Accompany with the rapid development of economy, the negative effect caused by human activities becomes obvious. In order to balance socio-economic development and environment protection, foreign scholars have brought forward reverse logistic and closed-loop supply chain theory. In recent years, the government has also increased attention to environmental protection and the people’s livelihood, introducing some related policies and using economic means to promote the product reverse recovery and stimulate consumer spending. The government’s policies affect the profit of manufacturer and retailer, also affect the long cooperation relationship, the manufacturer and retailer need to cooperate and coordinate again. Considering the reality, combined with the idea of revenue management, considering the secondary Closed-loop supply chain composed by the manufacturer and retailer, this paper studies the coordination of Closed-Loop Supply Chain under government subsidies, with modeling quantitative analysis method.The main work of this paper is as follows:First, the supply chain coordination, the game theory mostly Stackelberg game and the government incentives are reviewed. This paper sorts and summarizes the correlative literatures, and finds the limitation of the research. Basing on this, this paper finds the content and the meaning to study the coordination issues of the closed-loop supply chain considering the government subsidies to consumers.Second, the paper research the determine and random demand respectively, the manufacturer does decision-making on the wholesale price and callback price, the retailer defines the sale price and callback price as decision-making variables, and develop a model based on the manufacturer and retail profit-maximization.When making decisions centrality, using the optimum solution to solve the model and when decentralized decision making, using the Stackelberg game theory to solve the model. Learn the optimal sale price and callback price respectively and carry on the comparative analysis. Emphases on the effects of government subsidies to the Stackelberg coordination of manufacturer and retailer, the effects to the wholesale price and the sale price.Based on discussing the nature of the model, this paper conducts numerical analysis of expected profit and optimal price, and combines quantitative research and numerical example, shows the impact of change of various state variables and parameters on the expected profit and the Stackelberg coordination, and display a number of date chart with relevant management enlightenment.Finally, a summary of the full text is brought, which sums up the conclusions and contribution of this paper, points out the inadequacy, and further research directions.