Conduction Effect Of Controlling Shareholders Character、equity Incentive Intensity And The Company Value

According to "listing Corporation equity incentive management measures (Trial)" asthe background, which was issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission inDecember31,2005, this paper takes the implementation of equity incentive plan of theboard and the board of SME from2006to2010as samples, combines the normativeresearch and empirical research, empirical tests the conductional relationship amongcontrolling shareholders chart, equity incentive strength and company value.First of all, this paper elaborates the research background and the significance. Thenthrough reviewing the equity incentive related research achievement at home and board, itanalysis the inadequacies of the study, which is proposed to the point of this paper, at thesame time, it describes the methods of research.Secondly, this paper makes the definition of the related concept, including thecontrolling shareholder, equity incentive intensity and company value. Then it expoundsthe theoretical basis, principal-agent theory, incentive theory, corporate governance theoryand psychological ownership theory included, and analyzes the mechanism of thesetheories to the stock ownership incentive.Next, this paper makes an empirical test of the effect of the controlling shareholdercharacter to equity incentive intensity. The results show that, if the nature of theshareholders is as a private company, the value of the company is higher, or the weaker ofthe company value. There is negative correlation between ownership concentration and thestock incentive intensity. And when the controlling shareholders are shares, the equityincentive intensity is weaker, while the no-significance relationship between the force ofcontrolling shareholders and the stock option incentive intensity.Then, it tests the influence of the equity incentive intensity on the company value.And this part is divided into two steps. Fist, it tests the independent effects of the equityincentive intensity on the company value, that shows there is obvious positive correlationrelationship between the two. Second, it puts into new variable, namely the equityincentive intensity characteristic. And the tests, which examines the common influence ofthe equity incentive intensity characteristic and the equity incentive intensity on the company value, show that under the premise of significance effect of the equity incentiveintensity characteristic on the company value, the positive correlation between the equityincentive intensity and the company value is more strengthen, thus it proves that it existconduction relationship among controlling shareholders chart, equity incentive strengthand company value.Last but not least, it puts forward the conclusion, that the controlling shareholdercharacter has influenced equity incentive intensity, and equity incentive has significantlyinfluenced the company value, too. There is conduction relationship among the three, andthe controlling shareholders and stock option incentive intensity interactions can produceleverage effect on corporate value. According to the conclusions of this study, it canprovide suggestions from four aspects, that is, to optimizing the control rights structure,improve management performance evaluation system, enhance information disclosuresystem and accelerating the construction of effective capital market to perfect relevantlaws and regulations.