Top-Manager Characters, Corporate Governance And Inefficient Investment

Corporate investment is one of the three major financial decision-making behavior, which is the key to corporate profits, and which is decided to base the size of the interests of shareholders. Enterprises through investment activities to get return on investment. Therefore, the efficiency of corporate investment behavior is directly related to the ability of the business to maximize value, but also the relationship between the shareholders can receive maximum benefits. Investment has also been a hot research scholars at home and abroad.Based on economic activity in the "bounded rationality", we can see the manager’s decisions are not optimal, mainly due to the complex and changing environment, and managers the ability to understand the environment and cognitive ability are limited. Also, because the prevalence of internal principal-agent problem, our investments can not be completely optimal, namely, the existence of non-investment efficiency.Managers of listed companies as a corporate investment behavior makers and impl em enters, the enterprise has a direct impact on investment behavior. The efficiency of investment and different companies vary, so what factors affect the efficiency of investment in non-business? This paper will explore the managers of listed companies in China non-personal characteristics of the efficiency of corporate investment levels. And taking into account the existence of corporate governance mechanisms, further analysis of the corporate governance of the personal characteristics and business managers of non-regulation of the level of investment efficiency. This research mainly includes the following six parts:First, proposed this research background, a brief study show that the theoretical and practical significance, explained the need for this study. Then put forward the basic logic of this analysis framework and research methods. Finally, we illustrate this feature.Second, sort and review the relevant literature at home and abroad. In1984 Hambrick and Mason made the famous "upper echelons theory", which managers have the characteristics of the theoretical basis of the official. Upper echelons theory suggests that the management team characteristics and team members in-depth psychological, behavioral characteristics, whereas the deep-seated psychological and behavioral characteristics will directly affect strategic decision making and selection, can be seen the characteristics of managers associated with management practices. Domestic and foreign scholars, empirical studies have verified this. Principal-agent problem is accompanied by generation of a modern corporate system, prevalent in the company. The principal-agent problem is an important manifestation of the conflict the interests of managers and shareholders, managers do not always act to maximize shareholder value as a target, often exhibit behavior of individual self-interest of managers in the investment behavior on the performance of the non-investment efficiency. This is not only due to the presence of principal-agent problem, and also based on information asymmetry. Shareholders are not directly involved in the company’s management, between managers and shareholders, there is a serious information asymmetry, managers can easily lead to moral hazard. Thus, managers are closely related to behavior management and personal characteristics on the efficiency of corporate investment behavior of non-correlation. For this statistical data, select the manager’s age, education, gender, educational background and demographic characteristics of the five terms in order to represent the manager’s personal characteristics. Domestic and international research shows that managers of these demographic characteristics and level of business investment in non-efficiency-related, but different academic results are not consistent.Since the existence of principal-agent problem, shareholders in order to prevent managers to grab personal gain, on the development of a series of corporate governance mechanisms to monitor and restrict the behavior of managers. Current corporate governance mechanisms into internal governance and external governance mechanisms can be divided into four specific, that is, incentives, checks and balances mechanism, external takeover mechanism and the proxy contest mechanism. This paper only analyzes the company’s internal governance mechanism, the mechanism of incentives and checks and balances, select the chairman and general manager of the two jobs separate, the proportion of independent directors and executives to study three variables stake. Domestic and international research shows that corporate governance and business efficiency level of investment is a non-related relationship.The third, analysisd the relationship between theoretical of managers personal characteristics, corporate governance and business and investment behavior, and then make the hypothesis of this paper.The fourth, the hypothesis was studied on the basis of design. This paper selected the2009and2010in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies as a1283sample of empirical research. Second, build an empirical model of this article, that manager personal characteristics and level of business investment in non-efficient models, and managers of personal characteristics, corporate governance and business model of non-efficient level of investment. And define the model and measure the variables, the empirical analysis for the next preparation, which is non-efficient investment level explanatory variables we refer to Richardson’s method, the level of investment equation residuals as a non-efficient level of investment instead of a variable.The fifth, it will be mixed together to form a mixed data in2009and2010sample data to be2566samples at the basis of the previous paper, and use EVIEWS6.0and SPSS13.0software to analysis,such as the model for each regression analysis to test the foregoing theoretical assumptions.Finally, according to the above analysis come to the conclusion. First, the efficiency of China’s listed companies, the prevalence of non-investment behavior; followed by personal characteristics of the business managers of non-influential role in the efficiency of investment behavior, specifically in the manager’s age, education, educational background can significantly affect the efficiency of non-investment level, and sex and the term non-efficiency of the enterprise is not significantly affect the level of investment; final corporate governance mechanisms on the personal characteristics and business managers of non-regulation of the level of efficiency investments are not fully achieve the desired objectives, corporate governance mechanisms still need further improvement can be summarized the proportion of independent directors on the management of personal characteristics (education) affect the efficiency of investment behavior can play a non-expected inhibition, chairman and general manager of two level-one personal characteristics of managers (gender) level of investment and business from the non-efficiency to the expected inhibition, executive ownership proportions of managers personal characteristics (age, education, educational background, and tenure) and business investment in non-efficiency of inhibition is expected to play.The main features of this study is to examine not only the analysis of the characteristics of the individual managers of non-listed companies, the efficiency of investment behavior, but will also regulate corporate governance mechanisms as variables, to analyze the mechanism of regulation of corporate governance under the personal characteristics and business managers non-relationship between the efficiency of investment behavior.