| Every enterprise must face the issue of how to choose the debt maturity structure inthe financial decision-making. The inappropriate choice might bring a serious financialcrisis. However, to the great extent, the debt maturity structure depends on the managers.The decision itself as an act of agency, essentially the principal-agent problems may lead tosuboptimal debt maturity choice. While the insider control problems also make peopledoubtable about that the management ownership of actual effect matches with initialpurpose. With the equity division reform step by step, Chinese listed companies out of therealization of the full circulation shares an important step, under this special background,we attempt to investigate the effects of debt maturity structure from the perspective of themanagement stockholding.First, decision on debt maturity structure and managerial stockholding effect as thefocus for a detailed review of the literature, a comprehensive review on the debt maturitystructure and managerial stockholding effect on the debt maturity structure as the theme ofresearch status. Based on the status quo of the debt maturity structure and managementstockholding of Chinese listed companies, and select the public listed companies from2006to2010as the research object to take the empirical test, we found that there is asignificant negative correlation between managerial stockholding and debt maturitystructure, what’s more, we found that this negative correlation is more obvious in highcredit, low growth and relative concentration than in low credit grade, high growth,negative correlation and high concentration of listed companies. Finally, according to theconclusions of this study, combines with the reality of China’s institutional background, toestablish an effective managerial ownership incentive mechanism as well as theappropriate debt maturity structure coordinated development mechanism and puts forward the corresponding policy suggestions. |
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