Problems And Countermeasures Of China’s Stated-owned Holding Company Internal Financial Control

At the present stage, there is a distinct gap between the heat of the corporate governance research and practice effects. Its principle of soft constraints perform is not ideal. Some significant financial issues what they should do is not clear. In recent years, many serious financial governance issues revealed. For example, UF financial software dividend sent the present case, controlling shareholder of "cash" is suspected to harm small shareholders. The Wuliangye transfer of profits case, controlling shareholder being questioned by the associated company transactions to transfer the profits of listed companies. The above-mentioned case can be seen that the corporate governance principles of macroscopic."Soft constraints" binding is not strong; the treatment effect is not obvious. To improve the execution of the corporate governance principles and binding, it is the inevitable choice to start from the measurable, actionable financial governance.As a center of gravity, taking into account the balance of the various stakeholders, financial governance is the most important aspect of corporate governance. Financial governance of property rights is a series of institutional arrangements for a general meeting of shareholders, board of directors, and board of supervisors, managers and other authority of the company’s financial power configuration. Company’s internal financial control is limited to the corporate organizational boundaries within the financial governance. It is a reasonable arrangement within the enterprise through financial powers to the control system of constraints and the management of the financial behavior. The main purpose of internal financial control is to find the optimum efficiency the right to run the configuration structure. The company’s internal financial control is the company’s shareholders’ meeting, board of directors, supervisory board and management level of financial control over the allocation and the system of checks and balances through the arrangement of corporate property rights system to achieve. Financial governance theory is applied to the management of listed companies, it is conducive to building mutual coordination and restraining each other the entire system of governance, and promote a more rational and effective working capital of listed companies in order to achieve business objectives.State-owned holding company as an important form of state-owned asset management has an important position and high research value. The state-owned holding company in a key position in the state-owned asset management process, the primary responsibility for control and assurance is the responsibility of the state-owned assets in continuing operations and profit objectives. The state-owned holding companies in various industries located in the national economy, whether it is the perfect order of market competition, or to safeguard national economic security and support for technological innovation, play an important role. Especially in the external capital markets are still inadequate in China, internal financial control has an important position in the financial governance, and constantly improve the internal financial control of the state-owned holding company to realize the rational allocation of property rights between the company’s internal governance body, and contribute to more effective state-owned assets and to further promote sound and fast economic development.This paper selects the internal financial control of state-owned holding company as the object of study, and uses a standard research method, combined with the characteristics of China’s state-owned holding company, use of the basic theory and analysis of financial governance, access to a variety of journals and the related works at home and abroad. Supplemented by comparative analysis, to compare the foreign company’s financial governance mode of operation, analyzing its characteristics and where the success of the optimization problem of the financial governance of state-owned holding company to explore.The text is divided into five parts. The first part is the introduction section. Introduces the research background and significance of the topic, as well as current research on the theory of financial governance at home and abroad summarized. The second part expounds the characteristics of state-owned holding company, the concept, elements, content and nature about internal financial management, definition of internal financial control and financial governance of state-owned holding company. The third part is problems and reasons analysis of China’s State-owned holding company. Revealed many problems in the governance of state-owned holding company internal financial, such as financial decision-making capacity is not high in general meeting of shareholders, board of directors and financial control function is weakened, the formality of the Supervisory functions and business layers of financial decision-making myopic problem, and these issues deeper reason analysis, summed up the lack of diversified equity financial checks and balances, the financial decisions of the Board lack of authority of supervisors, the lack of independence and professional and business layer to the lack of effective financial incentive constraints and other reasons. The fourth part of the advanced experience by drawing on the financial governance of Temasek Holdings. Come to clear the SAC functions as a shareholder orientation, a highly independent and effective board of directors, and incentive constraints revelation through a multi-faceted performance appraisal. The fifth part is based on China’s state-owned holding company internal financial control problems and the cause of the problem, on the basis of learning from the experience of the foreign holding company of financial governance. Further improve China’s state-owned holding company internal financial governance measures, including the ownership structure optimized to achieve multiple financial checks and balances, to reshape the board of directors of the financial decision-making core of, and improve financial oversight functions of the Board of supervisors and improve the incentive and restrictive mechanism on the business layer.