Research On Agricultural Circulation Channel Structure Analysis And Selection

Agricultural products of different quality may choose different distribution channels due to the difficulties to identify their quality. With the high frequency of quality and safety accident, the research is practical to solve the problems about how to guarantee the high quality agricultural products to enter the market to be identified and purchased. Based on different quality agricultural products corresponding different circulation channels, Game models are established among the producer, seller and consumer. Different factors (such as the agricultural product quality, price, and government regulation) are considered in analyzing the gamers’ behavioral changes. And finally the measures to provide smooth circulation channels for the high quality agricultural products are obtained. The research content and achievements are as follows:(1) The current theoretical and circulation related researches of agricultural products are concluded to describe the current agricultural development situation and characteristics of agricultural products circulation, as well as the existing channel mode structure.(2) Based on the competition and cooperation relationship between producers and sellers, the Stackelberg Game Model is established to analyze the influences of producer and seller scale, the agricultural products quality and pricing on circulation channel choice. The results show that the productions of large producers generally go to the supermarket, and small producers’generally flow to Farmers Markets. The quantity purchased by supermarket is direct proportion to consumer demand, while the quality is inversely proportion to consumer demand. Small retailers tend to choose high quality agricultural products, and large supermarkets tend to choose that of low quality. To the same retailer, the proportion of purchasing high quality agricultural products is lower than that of low quality.(3) Signal transmission Game Model is established between sellers and consumers with price as the quality signal to analyze how the difference of quality information transmission affects the choice of circulation channels, and obtained how consumers make purchasing decisions in face of different transmission signals. The Game model analysis shows that in the equilibrium state, consumers are willing to purchase product in low price at the supermarket, while tend to pay high price for high-quality products at the Farmers’market. That is, supermarkets like to choose low-quality product in order to save cost, while the Farmer’s markets opt to sell high-quality product in order to maintain consumer loyalty. Thus, high-quality products generally go to Farmers’Market and the low-quality product mostly go to supermarkets.(4) The transactions behavior between sellers and producer is analyzed based on the governmental policy variables, including Taxation variable and Subsidy variable. Taxation variable mainly influence the consumers’behaviors, that is, purchasing amount and ultimate selling price. Subsidy variable affects the producers’behaviors, that is, production and investment costs. The Game Theory results show that when the tax incentives and financial subsidy reaches a certain degree, the optimal purchases quantity of high-quality products are larger than that of low-quality products. It means that more high-quality products will flux into markets, so accordingly farmers are encouraged to make high-quality products. In more abstract aspect, the quality of the products in the circulation market is improved and the circulation channel of products is optimized.