A Study On Management Equity Incentive And Performance Of The Listed Comyany

Management equity incentive has been widely used in managementpractice in every country. Equity incentive is an effective way for an enterpriseto achieve the long-term incentive to the management. It makes the managementand the enterprise share the consistent interest and solves the principal-agentproblem of management in the listed company effectively. Then theperformance of an enterprise can be effectively improved. Management equityincentive can be measured with the enterprise’ performance， so they are linkedto each other. The principal-agent theory says that the interest relationshipbetween the management and shareholders can be integrated through the equityincentive and the contradiction of the separation of ownership and the right tooperate can be solved to a certain extent， which achieves the goal ofmaximizing value of the enterprise by management equity incentive.Through the comparative analysis of the literature research and relatedtheories in and abroad，this thesis defines the related concepts to the equityincentive， preliminarily describes the definition of equity incentive and brieflyintroduces the institutional foundation for the implementation of our equityincentive. This thesis also further analyzes the current status and main mode ofour equity incentive. It takes52listed companies which carried equity incentivein2008to2010as the research objects to do the empirical study of equityincentive and enterprise performance. It investigates the impact of the variousinfluencing factors on the management equity incentive and its performancethrough SPSS and studies the relation between the shareholding proportion ofmanagement and its performance with econometric methods， such as Pearsoncorrelation analysis， factor analysis and regression analysis. The results are as follows:①According to the Pearson analysis， the performance of listedcompanies and the effect of managerial ownership incentive factors.②According to the factor analysis， the performance of the listed companiescomprehensive evaluation value by financial index characteristics of fouraspects.③According to the regression analysis， the performance of listedcompanies and the relationship between managerial shareholding has inverted Utype.This thesis proposes corresponding countermeasures according to theproblems which have been found， namely， the advance of the development ofthe equity incentive system in China’s need to be improved from the followingaspects: to foster a stable and efficient capital market; to establish and improvethe professional manager market; to improve laws and regulations of the equityincentive; in order to let the company construct be reasonable， such asstrengthening shareholders’ monitoring to managers， to strengthen thesupervisory role of independent directors and to strengthen the Supervision andcheck of the Board of Supervisors; to construct the scientific performanceappraisal system and improve the performance evaluation system.The innovation of this paper is that， on the implementation of themanagement equity incentive factors， managerial ownership， corporateperformance indicators for data collection and analysis. Finally this paper foundin a variety of considering the factors， the management equity incentive andperformance in listed companies of the correlation between， finally from thelisted company’s external environment and internal management of a number ofaspects of the research problem and proposed solutions.