Discussion The Problems Of Accounting Rent-seeking Of Listed Companies In China

Listed companies in their business activities, should overt the appropriate accounting information that investors make rational investment decisions based on. This action is guarantee for the achievement of allocating the resources of the community efficiently, and is also the basis for the effective operation of capital markets. Once let the false accounting information overspread, it will make the company’s stock value seriously divorced from reality, disrupted the normal order of the capital market:it will damage the interests of investors, reduce investors’ enthusiasm, hind the orderly development of securities markets. But in China, numbers of listed companies prefer to tamper with the accounting data, prettify accounting statements, and can disclosure illegally, control accounting information, this repeated emergence.From the perspective of the internal organization of listed companies, the primary financial personnel are the people who compile the accounting information directly, should hold the decision-making power, but in fact they only bear the full cost of making such information, controlling shareholders and management control the power to consume the information, the listed company’s accounting information that flow within the company even may not be completely transparent, the presence of asymmetric information makes rent space in the public domain then emerges. Accounting, as a means of allocating socio-economic resources, has its own operational features of directing economic consequences, accounting rent-seeking becomes a direct method to develop non-productive profit-seeking for different economic interests of the listed companies. The rent-seeking behavior of various stakeholders will cause a distortion of accounting information and disrupt the socialist market economic order, affecting the state’s macro-economic regulations. America’s " Enron" and China’s " Yin Guang Xia incident" fully illustrates fully that accounting rent-seeking brought about damage largely, directly or indirectly. Therefore, it’s necessary to carefully analyze and summarize listed company’s accounting rent-seeking behavior and on this basis raise the comments and suggestions of how to prevent accounting rent-seeking, guide the healthy development of listed companies and provide a good reference results for regulatory agencies to promote the economic development and social stability in China.Rent-seeking theory is used to explain the accounting issues in China began in2000and has obtained many encouraging research results. The logical starting point of accounting rent-seeking study is the economic consequence, meanwhile accounting rent-seeking is a process. Accounting rent-seeking performed as a game of various interest groups for their own interests while accounting’s economic consequences is a kind of state. William R.Scott raised a description of accounting rent-seeking:as true performance of listed companies to be certain, adopt different accounting policies may be disclosed to the different results of operations, thereby affecting the price of securities may affect the company’s value. In other words, under the conditions of asymmetric information, through the recognition and measurement of changes in accounting method, you can change the accounting information, and thus change the results of the decision-making of stakeholders. The idea that accounting causes the unproductive and unfair wealth transformation and the effectiveness of resource allocation is very similar with the thinking of rent-seeking.This paper has discussed the concept and the main characteristics of listed company’s accounting rent-seeking behavior in our country on the basis of domestic and overseas researches, summarized the economic consequences of accounting rent-seeking. Meanwhile it mainly used western rent-seeking theory, with the specific situation of China, analyzed the form of listed company’s accounting rent-seeking. In order to maximizing their own interests, before accounting information in the enterprise is announced, the operators will be used to change some accounting figures, the disclosure of accounting information will make they better. Major shareholders of listed companies or the major operators control the General Assembly and the board of directors; they make the company obey the will of the majority shareholder, through the advantage of controlling shareholders the right to vote, occupied by the huge funds of listed companies, major shareholders of false-funded, with the other major shareholder of the related party transactions, the form of earnings manipulation, such as rent-funded activities. Depend on the basic rent-seeking theory and the economic consequences of accounting theory, this paper studies China’s listed companies accounting rent-seeking reasons, so that the benefit arises from rent-seeking motives of accounting, the imperfect accounting system provides a possible rent-seeking. On the basis of it, this article describes the reasons of accounting rent-seeking of listed companies in China. There are still many problems in China’s securities market, mainly the construction of binding legal norms imperfect. To take effective measures to accounting rent-seeking has become an urgent task. Finally, according to the status of listed company’s accounting rent-seeking raises several ways to prevent accounting rent-seeking. In accordance with reason of rent-seeking and rent-seeking means of reasons, this paper argues that accounting controls are fundamental and should strengthen the legal system, improve accounting controls in order to reduce rent-seeking activities of accounting. The paper tries to use prescriptive research to spread out discussion, use deductive method to construct basic theory of accounting rent-seeking behaviors, adopt descriptive method to sum up main types of accounting rent-seeking behaviors according to realistic situation.In the process of research, this paper mainly adopts qualitative analysis method combining with some cases, follow the thinking of "raise problems—analyze problems—solve problems" to theoretically analyze and practically test accounting rent-seeking behaviors of listed companies in our country.This paper attempts to achieve a breakthrough in the following aspects:First, to discuss internal accounting rent-seeking together with the external accounting rent-seeking, and both are equally important. Internal accounting rent-seeking, there are certain practical significance of corporate governance. The second is based on the listed company’s actual condition, according to the accounting rent-seeking of listed company in our country, we can deeply explore and analyze the accounting rent-seeking behavior, with a certain degree of practical significance. Third, use normative research methods combined with specific case studies and data analysis to interpret accounting rent-seeking behavior in order to get the theory of universal significance.