The Research On Managerial Ownership And Accounting Conservatism

Conservatism has the important position in the international accounting standards. In our country, it is explicitly listed as one of the important financial report features. The first researcher of the accounting conservatism is watts (1993) professor, then until the appearance of the chapter Basu (1997), it appears to measure the method of conservatism systematically. Accounting conservatism is one of important index to measure the information quality of financial reports. The higher the degree of accounting conservatism, users of accounting information of enterprise evaluation is higher, and different users in a consensus height can make more reliable decisions according to report information. So the research to accounting conservatism provides the theoRetical basis and practical method on improving China’s governance environment and adjusting the ownership structure of listed companies. Accounting conservatism principle requires that the speed of response to bad news is faster than that of response to good news in the process of financial reports. It has high significance for accounting system formulation and accounting practices. The managerial stockholding is originated from the United States from Pfizer (Ptizer) company to put forward the manager stock option in1952. Since then, management personnel shareholding is widely implemented in western. In recent years, the proportion of our country management personnel in salary structure is growing, by influence of western countries, the managerial stockholding become the world’s most important incentive mode of listed company. The managerial stockholding is a long-term incentive mechanism, and reduces agency cost. Thus it promotes enterprise operation performance. Management personnel shareholding, as one part of the company governance mechanism, will produce profound influence to accounting information quality, including accounting information robustness. When the managerial stockholding level is low, prudent accounting information is an advantage for management. The managerial stockholding can promote the accounting information robustness. But when their shareholding level is to a certain extent, the management will be able to apply this extensive influence and voting rights to keep them does not affect their wages and employment by company in the value maximization goal. At this time, management will reduce the accounting information steady. So the research of management of how much management shareholding will influence the accounting robustness will help to improve the company’s management environment and seek a best level of management shareholding to make accounting conservatism held in a best level.In recent years, the literature of study the accounting conservatism effect factors are increasing, as well as the result. But there are few scholars study the influence about the listed company management shareholding to the accounting robustness. But few scholars study the changes of accounting robustness in different control of the management shareholding level between the listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies. Management shareholding is an important change of equity structure. But in our country, the use of time of the management shareholding, which is the long-term effective encouraging mechanism, is still short. Management environment of the listed company is not mature, state and non-state owned holding listed companies is more significant different. Therefore the research results by distinguish state-owned holding non-state-owned holding are more joint at our country securities market. In view of this, from the management shares of listed companies, this article takes the relation between managerial stockholding and accounting conservatism as the topic, and discusses state and non-state respectively. on reference of existing research results, and according with our system background and the current situation of the development of the securities market, this article discusses the relationship between the management shareholding of state-owned holding listed companies and non-state-owned of listed companies and accounting robustness respectively through the theoRetical analysis and empirical testing methods. This paper also innovatively embeds debt levels factors, and study the debt constraints whether will inhibit the influence of management shareholding to accounting robustness. So as to it can provide the theory and empirical evidence for the development of China’s listed companies and the construction of securities market.This paper selects a-share listing of the two cities in2005-2010as the sample data, and achieves the empirical survey of the influence of the management shareholding to accounting robustness by using Basu (1997) model and its extension model. It systematically studies the following three problems:First,that the relationship between management shareholding and accounting robustness;Second, in the state holding non-state-owned holding listed companies, the difference of the influence of management shareholding to accounting robustness;Third, in non-state-owned listed companies, by introducing debt level factors, we study the effect which these factors impose on relationship between the management shareholding and accounting robustness.This paper research conclusion listed as follows:First, management shareholding ratio is negatively related to the accounting robustness, that is, the higher the share ratio of management, the lower the degree of accounting conservatism; The lower the share ratio of the management, the higher the degree of accounting conservatism;Second, as to the state-owned holding listed companies, there is no significant relationship between management shareholding and accounting robustness; as to non-state owned holding listed companies, there is significantly negative correlation between management shareholding and accounting robustness;Third in non-state-owned holding listed companies, that the higher debt levels of the company, the more beneficial to restrain negative correlation between management shareholding and accounting robustness.