The Study On The Influences Of Administrate Structure To Audit Behaviors Among Listed Companies

Good corporate governance structure is often a central feature of high-valueenterprise, but the high value of the enterprise does not necessarily have bettercorporate governance structure. This is because one of the characteristics of themodern enterprise is the ownership and operation of separation, the resulting agencycosts of corporate governance as one of the factors that hinder the company toenhance the value. In order to reduce the problem of asymmetric information andfalse information management and enterprise performance, the audit mechanism wasintroduced to the business operations and management framework. Audit mechanismas to reduce the information asymmetry between management and shareholders oflisted companies, to smooth the agency cost effective system design, in essence, isanother layer of agency relationship between management and shareholders layer ofthe original agency relationship outside. Apparently independent and often providemore accurate information to the market and investors with a high degree ofobjectivity of the audit results, however, is the audit itself is another level of agencyrelationship, then listed shareholding structure and management structure of corporategovernance The structure will determine the listed company’s audit selection, therebyaffecting the quality of the audit of listed companies, and ultimately affect the valueof listed companies.This article based on the characteristics and behavior of Chinese listed companyaudit, try to tap the relationship of the governance structure of listed companies foraudit selection, in order to determine the basic mechanisms of the governancestructure of listed companies in the external oversight agency relationship. Thisarticle will provide the specific impact of China’s listed companies in the internal governance structure of the related audit reports, such as the choice of the number ofaudit institutions, the choice of inside and outside audit agencies, the audit opinion onthe choice and the choice of audit rates, and then determine the governance structureof listed companies affect audit efficiency. Through research, the conclusions of thisarticle will help to analyze what the corporate governance structure to better maintaina robust audit environment, and thus lay the foundation for investors to evaluate anddetermine the audit reports of listed companies.Take full account of the Chinese audit market opening and the integrity of thedata under the premise of the paper selected for audit records of all listed companiesin Shanghai and Shenzhen in2010, and as a sample use of the general linearregression and binary choice model governance structure of listed companies auditbehavior mechanism to conduct a comprehensive analysis. Empirical process fromtwo levels of management structure and ownership structure on the mechanism of thegovernance structure of listed company audit reports measurement testing andanalysis, and in accordance with the indicators reflect the basic characteristics of theclassification and regression, to identify and determine the results of listed companiesaffect the audit behavior of the specific mechanism.The conclusions of this paper show that the true impact of audit reports of thegovernance structure of listed companies to choose which management can be moredirect impact on the audit agency-related activities, thereby affecting the efficiency ofaudit quality and audit market. Of course, the empirical results also show that theindependence of the audit market in China is gradually strengthen, at the same time asthe gradual improvement of the capital market, capital market to improve the abilityof listed companies’ governance environment is also rising, there is reason to believethat capital as reflected in the audit market will continue to increase itstrustworthiness will be improved.