Voluntary Disclosure And Management Ownership: Evidence From The SME Board Of SZSE

Information which generated by financial accounting system is running the final result, a real and effective accounting information not only help protect the interests of investors, but also more conducive to the healthy development of securities markets. Companies disclosing adequate information to communicate to the investor strengthen and improve the corporate governance environment, thereby affecting the efficiency of the allocation of capital markets.Mandatory information disclosure requirements according to whether they Mandatory to disclosure can be divided into voluntary disclosure and mandatory disclosure. Mandatory information disclosure is evidence of legal and securities regulations and other regulatory authorities to ensure market efficiency and safety requirements listed company must disclose the information. Voluntary information disclosure of listed companies is disclosed report, except in accordance with the requirements of regulatory authorities to provide some information in addition to, and to provide comments on the company’s financial position and business strategy planning some information, this section provides additional information will help Investors in the company in a more effective assessment to determine the actual state of the company which, on their impact on investment strategies.The quality of voluntary disclosure may reflect the quality of information disclosure, disclosure quality and corporate governance is closely related to the degree of voluntary disclosure of information to improve corporate governance will undoubtedly have a significant impact. Especially in the context of our system of large, relatively low efficiency of corporate governance, most of the information is actually controlled by senior management. Senior managers to improve corporate governance as the most influential factor, the characteristics of the structure of the related factors which can be seen on a significant impact on voluntary disclosure, so as to improve the level of voluntary disclosure of information to provide empirical support.The research about voluntary disclosure before focused on the Main Board listing and Shenzhen, Shenzhen City, given the current market has become more sophisticated small plates, and its characteristics have become the choice of our study:company size smaller than the Main Board listed company, Features of Corporate Governance are not the same, such as listed companies control more than a natural person and his family, and a relatively high stake; most directly by the chairman of a listed company as the actual controller, a small number of business partners and their immediate family members as; Board of Supervisors exist in name only; control rights and cash diversion less separation of powers.We analyzed the existing literature found that:voluntary disclosure abroad is not only a wide range, and has formed the basic research framework, in Taiwan’s voluntary disclosure of information to study the formation of small and there is no theoretical system, and more on the surface of study, research was only focused on corporate governance-related aspects, such as ownership structure and board structure. This further increases the need for our study.We examined the extent of voluntary disclosure and the impact of managerial ownership, managerial ownership found little effect of the level of voluntary disclosure may on the one hand, and executives need to pay a reasonable return for incentives to increase voluntary disclosure, and there will be another negative for the company’s core competitiveness contains some important information to investors concerning disclosure. Although research has repeatedly proven the competitiveness of the information with a disclosure to the market will not affect the company’s market strategy implementation, but listed companies will be based on cost-benefit considerations provided automatically to the market to give up the core competitive capabilities. We believe that these two factors is the superimposed result of the current situation there, of course, the results of regression show that executives need to pay a reasonable return on their own interests to maximize voluntary disclosure initiative to increase temporarily the upper hand.Equity nature of the impact of voluntary disclosure is not verified by our model, which may be superimposed aspects common causes of results:one state-owned holding company supervisor imperfect corporate governance, leading to the degree of voluntary disclosure decreases Another negative in order to avoid the cost of litigation risk and the state-owned assets management institutions have strict supervision, and increase the voluntary disclosure of information; family holding sound corporate governance structure of listed companies tend to voluntarily disclose the relevant information; and keen to control the actual controller the right to the chase, the right to reduce the separation of cash flow, resulting in lower voluntary disclosure. We speculate that these may be the joint result of the game led to the current voluntary disclosure of information on significant state does not exist.