The Empirical Study On The Tunneling By The Major Shareholder Impacted By The Characteristics Of Board Of Directors

Listed companies are the main body of the securities market, its governance structure is very improvement, which related to the value of their own position, thereby affecting the general interests of investors and the stock market’s health. An important feature of the modern enterprise is the separation of ownership and management rights, which had a principal-agent relationship. The principal-agent relationships because of information asymmetry between the operators may be to pursue their own interests at the expense of shareholders. The other agency problem appears between the major shareholders and the minority shareholders because of the conflict of interest. However, in emerging markets, the latter agency is particularly problematic, because the protection of the minority shareholders in emerging markets, such as protection of minority shareholders in the legal and judicial system, the dispersed ownership structure, board independence and effective high information disclosure, is not sound. Therefore, the major shareholders of listed companies plunder the minority shareholders occur frequently. The agency problem between the major shareholders and the minority shareholders become an important role in corporate governance research.Purpose of this study is to analyze the agency conflicts of the major shareholder of listed companies in China and the minority shareholders, in the view of the nature of the ultimate controller of the companies, from both theoretical and empirical characteristics of the board. This study is to reveal the tunneling behavior of the major shareholders, to improve the understanding and awareness of agency problems between the major shareholder and minority shareholders, to further standardize and improve the governance structure of listed companies in China.The logic of this idea is:tunneling behavior is an important channel for the major shareholders to obtain control interest. In order to restrain the tunneling, the study try to explain how the characteristics of board of directors impact the tuning by the major shareholders, affecting by the nature of the controlling shareholder of listed companies, the tunneling behavior of the major shareholders divide into state-controlled and non-state-controlled comparison. Based on the above research ideas, this article consists of the following sections:ChapterⅠ:Introduction. This chapter first describes the background and significance of this study.ChapterⅡ:Literature Review. This part elaborates the simple comment of the characteristics of board of directors and tunneling behavior in the study domestic and international.ChapterⅢ:Theoretical analysis and research hypothesis. This part is the theoretical basis, which involves defining some basic concepts, principal-agent theory in detail, and in-depth analysis of the causes of tunneling behavior, and finally proposing the hypothesis of this study.ChapterⅣ:Research design. According to research hypotheses, the study chooses 817 samples in CSMAR, constructs two regression models, and defines the variables.ChapterⅤ:Empirical results and analysis.First, the samples were analyzed by descriptive statistical analysis of data. Secondly, the paper did multiple regression analysis.Consistent with the expected results, verify the four hypotheses. Finally, to ensure the reliability of conclusions, we conduct a sound test. The results showed that:descriptive statistics of extreme values in some variables do not have a material impact on the conclusions, but also verify the four hypotheses.ChapterⅥ:Research findings and inspiration.This part of the empirical conclusions of this paper summarized the same time, put forward, including strengthening the management of large shareholders, improve the independent director system, strengthen information disclosure system, establish a sound legal environment and other four policy recommendations.Innovations and scholarly contribution of this paper is mainly reflected in the following areas:First, this the ultimate controller of the shares the perspective of the nature of features from the perspective of the Board SPECIAL market environment between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders agency problems, to further standardize and improve the governance structure of listed companies in China to make some basic work.Second, this study based on ideas different from the past to explore the impact of a major shareholder tunneling behavior characteristics of the new factors the board, that shareholder’s ownership percentage in the board index. Third, the use of new funds used this degree metric.The inadequacy of this paper is mainly manifested in the following aspects:First, the nature of the controlling shareholder of this use of the simplified approach does not distinguish in more detail. Second, the paper added to the large shareholder’s voting rights in the use of the board index, because of the lack of data for this indicator, the board of directors of large shareholders in the shareholder-owned stake of the correlation analysis of occupation will have some impact, and its explanatory power need further verification.