| Accounting information offered by listed companies is an important basis for their stakeholders to analyze and make decision.The outside stakeholders will judge investment value of listed companies and make capital decision according to accounting information. So accounting information is an crucial factor for resource configuration.But problem of information asymmetry is unavoidable in capital market. Information asymmetry could damage interest of investors and reduce the efficiency of capital markets to the allocate resources.Therefor it is necessary to increase accounting information transparency of listed companies for decreasing agency costs protecting interests of investors and improving the efficiency of capital markets to the allocate resources.So many research have showed that transparency of accounting information in Chinese capital market is low.It is urgent to regulate accounting information disclouse of listed company strictly, improve transparency of accounting information and decrease information asymmetry between inside managers and outside stakeholders for develop Chinese capital market in the long run.This paper discusses how do company managers’motivation influence transparency of accounting information in Chinese listed company. This paper analyzes the agency theory, incomplete contract theory, asymmetric information theory,the incentive theory and managers’motivation to influence accounting Information disclosure policy to empirical factors that influence listed company acoounting transparency.And the paper also has explored effective ways to increase listed company accounting transparency,in order to provides a theoretical and empirical basis for improve accounting information disclosure system of Chinese listed companies.Currently researches about this area have mainly focused on the meaning,the factors and outcomes of accounting information and managers’motivations.This paper have analyzed related literatures at home and abroad and have found that most of the literatures are foucused on one factor or some factors instead of all factors.Literatures at home are mainly about company governance. Literatures about management motivation have got some representative conclusions,but not enough.There is not enough researches about managers motivations interaction and managers motivations influence company accounting information transparency.This paper have analyzed mechanism of accounting information system, financial reporting providing process and the path of accounting information conversion.For accounting earning information is the most important and most concerned information of stakeholders, this paper have definited accounting information transparency as to what extent could earning information discloused by companies could reflect the fure situation. Transparent accounting information could reflect all transactions and financial position turely,completly,unambiguously and dicloused adequately and timely.Agency theory, incomplete contract theory, asymmetric information theory and the incentive theory could explain accounting information transparency. Modern enterprise system is based on the principal-agent relationship foundation. Because of interest between principal and agent are not fully consistent, usually the principal agents have more information resources and decision-making power,when it is difficult to achieve complete control in the principal case, agents must have incentives to reducing the transparency of accounting information in certain parts of the accounting information passing chain to maximize their own interests. In the contract theory,for information resources between the principal and agent is asymmetric, agents are equipped to take advantage of their information advantage and contract incompleteness to hide the true accounting information for achieveing their own interests to maximize.Therefore the contract incompleteness would reduce the transparency of accounting information. In asymmetric information theory, management executives directly involved in enterprise have more information than outside stakeholds, information asymmetry between shareholders and managers must bring about adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Financial information discloused by listed company could transact signal and reduce the adverse effects caused by asymmetric information. So improve the transparency of accounting information of listed companies and reduce the information asymmetry between parties is an effective way to reduce agency costs,and improve capital market efficiency.In incentive and restraint mechanisms, designing a system to convergent utility function of shareholders and managers as much as possible could encourage managers to try their best for the interests of shareholders and encourage managers to fully disclose company information to outside shareholders. Effective incentive and restraint mechanisms could convergent utility function of shareholders and managers, encourage agents to improve the transparency of internal information, inhibit their opportunistic tendencies and alleviate the conflict between principal and agent, to effectively reduce agency costs.Based on the above analysis, this paper have taken the transparency of accounting information as the research object, and the supply of accounting information will be considered to be senior managers controlled variables, analysis of the profit motive of managers accounting information of listed companies policy factors.This paper have taken earnings aggression degree,earnings smoothness degree and comprehensive transparency of accounting information as measure of transparency of accounting information of listed companies respectively, Using a filtered 2006 to 2009 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies all the data as a research object,to empirical senior managers motivation of avoiding delisting control, capital market financing, optimizing stock returns and departure influence transparency of accounting information.This paper have get the following conclusion,firstly, motivation of avoiding delisting control negatively correlated with transparency of accounting information significantly. The major impact of this motivation is significant in the short term,but unsignificant in the long term. This shows that the management of the special treatment companies have stronger earnings management motivation than other companies.’special treatment’policy may be prompted, earnings management of this type of listed companies to some extent.Secondly, motivation of capital market financing of executives of listed companies negatively correlated with transparency of accounting information significantly both in the short time and in the long run. This shows that as relevant laws and regulations requiring for listed companies must reach earnings line for refinancing qualifications, management of listed companies with public financing motivation manipulate earnings artificially to obtain financing qualifications. This problem reduce the transparency of accounting information.Thirdly, motivation of optimizing stock returns positively correlated with transparency of accounting information,but the relationship is not significant.This shows that the management equity incentive plan could help to improve the transparency of accounting information,but share incentives for managers have not yet achieved the desired results,because China’s listed companies is generally low level of managerial ownership and equity incentive system is not complete.Forthly, motivation of departure negatively correlated with transparency of accounting information significantly in the short time but not in the long run.This shows that to avoid departure or higher pay and professional reputation, chairman of the board or general manager willing be depart may be carried out manual adjustments on the company’s accounting information. The motivation is clearly less affected in the scope of the long-term.Based on the foregoing theoretical analysis and empirical testing, this paper put forward four proposals measures to improve the transparency of accounting information of listed companies in China.Firstly, this paper argues that current criteria of the special treatment system is oversimplified,and easy to avoid. Comprehensive evaluation system for special treatment company should be established and replace oversimplified current criteria of the special treatment system. Comprehensive assessment system should take full account of the particularity, of special treatment-companies, comprehensively evaluate the company’s development capacity, financial performance, asset quality, operational efficiency and solvency by multi-level index system,and take development capacity as key evaluation objects.Secondly,because of existing qualification examination indicators of refinancing is oversimplified,and easy to avoid, many listed companies manipulate the accounting profit to reach this threshold.So This paper argues that building a diversified financial qualifications evaluation system could avoid this pitfall. Diversified financial qualifications evaluation system means change the existing single profit targets indicators, increase the content of assessment indicators of listed companies performance, use, including accounting income, profits structure and development capacity and other indicators to evaluate performance of listed companies。Thirdly, listed companies in China need to further improve the remuneration of senior management mechanism and establish pay system combined short-term incentives and long-term incentive based on the business value in the basis of financial information. Clear the rights of senior management, responsibilities and interests,in order to incentive senior management to concern long-term interests of shareholders and reduce their self-motivation to provide false accounting information. Ultimately improve the transparency of accounting information.Thirdly, govement should change non-standard employment status of management system, cultivate and improve the manager market. Highly developed manager market is conducive to evaluate business performance of managers more objectively,and could combined managers long-term career interests and the long-term interests of the business organically, and thus reduce short-term behavior of executives. |
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