Based On The Game Analysis Of Listed Corporate’s Equity Financing Preference In Different Governance Structure

China’s market economic is developing, modern enterprise system has been improved gradually, the listed company’s financing way and capital source are diversified,the listed company’s primary issue is the selection of optimal financing way.Western countries researched the enterprise financing structure, they found that the reasonable enterprise financing order are internal financing, credit financing and equity financing. In our country, the listed company shows obvious equity financing preference.This paper used game theory, from the governance structure perspective, setting up game models to research china listed companies’ equity financing preference phenomenon, and about the different governance structure of listed company to make a systematic and profound analysis on equity financing preference behavior, and on this basis to explore how to regulate the financing of China’s listed companies. This paper has six chapters, The first chapter illustrates the background and significance, the structure arrangement and research method, at the same time, it summarizes the related literatures. The second chapter collect and analysis some data which come from the listed companies at home and abroad in recent years, the data shows that the listed company financing structure difference is markedly big, and the listed companies prefer to equity financing in China. The third chapter analyze the equity financing preference phenomenon of listed companies, which are controlled by big shareholders. It construct game models analyze equity appreciation income and private benefits of control, which are gained by large stockholders. With two equity structure as the foundation, analyzing large shareholders through a rights and by the two equity financing way to acquire equity appreciation income, big shareholder control listed company under present equity financing preference characteristics. At the same time, big shareholders grab private benefits of control through the equity financing, along with the increase in the number of holdings increased, and along with the increase in the degree of legal supervision decreased. The fourth chapter analyze the equity financing preference phenomenon of listed companies, which are controlled by insider. when the incentive issue grab private benefits of control, it construct game models, and the influence of the stock ownership incentive."Insider control" listed company under present equity financing preference characteristics, to grab private benefits of control, it will reduce the banking facility of creditor’s rights and increase the banking facility of equity. By giving a certain percentage of the market share in order to limit executive gaining control private income, and effective control of the executive the excessive partiality for equity financing. The fifth chapter summarizes the conclusions which is from the previous section analysis.On the basis of there, it raises some suggestions and countermeasures to normal the listed companies’ financing behavior.