Study On The Effect Of The Implementation Of Stock Incentives By Chinese Listed Companies: Based On The Perspective Of Agency Cost

Equity incentive by giving operators some of the shares to shareholders consistentwith the interests of the target, thereby improving the performance of the company, isa solution to the conflict between shareholders and managers of long-term incentivetools. China in the1990s, the introduction of share-based incentive system and in2005began the promulgation of relevant policies and regulations of the equityincentive practice norms and guidelines.The purpose of this study is a test of China’s listed companies equity incentive effectof implementation, Empirical its ability to inhibit the principal-agent problem, canreduce the agency costs of the company, thereby improving the performance of thecompany. Expand this article according to the following five parts: Part I introducethe research background and significance of research and research methods;the second part of equity incentive for high tube and the impact of corporate behaviorthese two aspects of the literature review; the third part of the brief analysis of theequity incentives and principal-agent theory and human capital theory; the fourth partof the empirical test, through the implementation of empirical data inspection equityincentive effect; the fifth part of this article conclusions and research prospects.In the empirical part, tested from four aspects: Whether the equity incentive caninhibit the first class of agency costs? Whether the state-owned enterprises toimplement the equity incentive effect of inhibition of the first class of agency costs tobe weaker than private enterprise? Whether equity incentive can be able to inhibit theinvasion and occupation of the interests of the controlling shareholder? Whetherequity incentive can improve company performance? Through Testing, we can drawthe following conclusions:(1)The level of equity incentives and agency costs has asignificant negative linear correlation, able to resolve the conflict betweenshareholders and managers and play its role in long-term incentive;(2)Relative to thestate-owned enterprises, equity incentives in the private enterprise better able toinhibit the operators serving consumer moral hazard, but inhibit the operators ofopportunistic behavior between the two there was no significant difference;(3)Equityincentive can inhibit the controlling shareholder of listed companies fundsembezzlement;(4)Equity incentive can improve the long-term performance of the company, but over time the effect of more and more weak.