The Empirical Research On Non-pecuniary Compensation "Stickiness" And Factor Of The "Stickiness"

Non-pecuniary compensation as a complement to optimal contraction hasincentived managers to some extent.but it also leads to higher cost of agency.Why theNon-pecuniary compensation is the asymmetry in different directions of the activitybetween the activity has increased and decreased?The article studies the reason of thestickiness of non-pecuniary compensation using Managerial Power Approach.IsInvestor Protection Execution could influnance Non-pecuniary compensation andimprove corporate governance?By selecting2007-2010listed companies as the study sample and adoptingempirical methodology, We examine the determinants of non-pecuniary compensationfor the first time,and study the existence of sticky issue of top managementcompensation in listed companies based on the stickiness-model, level-model andchange-model, and goes further to study the elements of stickiness of non-pecuniarycompensation from the angle of agency problem.We found that there was non-pecuniary compensation “stickiness”,The“stickinss”of non-pecuniary compensation is the asymmetry in different directions ofthe marginal expense or cost change rate between the activity has increased anddecreased.the non-pecuniary compensation is due to regulation on cash compensationin SOEs. and would investor protection execution has a significant negative effect onrestraining non-pecuniary compensation stickiness of Chinese Public Companies. Andthe investor protection institution have improved corporate governance.