Study Of The Effect Of The Value Of Listed Companies Impacted By The Top Manager Who Part-time In The Company Of Large Shareholder

Top managers(directors or general managers)from the large shareholders of listedcompanies is part of a common phenomenon that has been concerned by monitor andmanagement、media and community．People have different viewpoints about what effect ofvalue do executives who part-time in companies of large shareholder impact on the listedcompany. This paper argues that executives part-time at the major shareholder of listedcompany as a governance phenomenon， will inevitably linked with some corporategovernance characteristics． Therefore， this article from the perspective of corporategovernance，the first analysis for which factors may lead to executives part-time in thecompany of large shareholders. Then this thesis through two part of the impact of the majorshareholder ("invasion effect" and "monitor effect") to analysis the impact on the value ofthe listed company companies when executives part-time in the company of largeshareholder．The paper based on data of listed companies for2010, selected1312board-directorsamples and1234genera manager samples for empirical analysis. This paper analyzes thefactors related to corporate governance (ownership structure, properties，etc.) which can leadto the executives of listed companies part-time in the company of large shareholder, thisanalysis found that: the higher the separation of ownership and control of major shareholders，and the lower the share of checks and balances are more likely part-time in largeshareholders． Furthermore， compared with non-state-controlled listed companies,state-controlled listed company’s chairman in the large shareholders are more likely topart-time, while the probability of general manager part-time in large shareholders lower thenthe former(non-state-controlled listed companies)．Further analysis of this is paper found：the listed company’s shareholders in large part-timechairman of the board will also have a "invasion effect" and "monitor effect", and thisphenomenon exists in the listed companies of low-level governance. In the listed companieswhich have low levels of governance, chairman part-time in the major shareholders generate"invasion effect" greater than "monitor effect"， allowing the value of the listed companieswhose chairman part-time in the major shareholders less than the value of the listedcompanies whose chairman do not．This article also found the number of general managerpart-time in the large of shareholder to be much less than the chairman，and the impact on thevalue of the company also smaller．...