| With the development of China’s securities market, the listed companies isincreasing, improper related party transactions of listed companies has becomeincreasingly prominent. So far, the regulatory authorities have issued a series of laws,rules and regulations to regulate related party transactions of listed companies, andregulators imposed on related party transactions with the government regulationbehavior of price control, quantity control and so on.On the basis of analyzed and organized the results of previous studies, relatedparty transactions of listed companies in China and its regulatory status is researchedfrom the perspective of law-economics, it is concluded that there is a lack ofsupervision of the related party transactions in China, and put forward our views andsuggestions on how to improve the regulatory system of related party transactions.This paper consists of five parts:The first part is the introduction, introduced the research background andsignificance, research status and methods of the topic, and put forward the researchideas, the structure of this article and the possible innovations.The second part is interpretation of the proposition about related partytransactions of listed companies. It is discussed from the three aspects of related partytransactions: the concept related of party transactions of listed companies, theclassification of related party transactions and the related party transactions theory.The third part is the analysis of the status quo of the legal regulation of relatedparty transactions of listed companies in China. I analyzed firstly the nature of thelegal regulation of related party transactions of listed companies, then meticulouscombing current related party transactions legal regulatory system, come to the legalregulation of China related party transactions has formed a system, but there is stillBut there is still insufficient.The fourth part is to analyze the behavior of government regulation and related party transactions. Firstly, I studied the current government regulatory approach aboutrelated party transactions. Followed I use the methods of game theory to study thebehavior of government regulation and the associated trading enterprises,theoretically verify the impact of the changes about the related party transactionsregulatory policies on the behavior of related party transactions, corporate behavioralso has an impact on policy making. And I come to the conclusion that increasing thepunishment can reduce related party transactions. Finally under the hypothesis ofcomplete information, using the game theory of bargaining theory, Prohibitiveregulation efficiency of related transactions supervision system is analyzed, and it isconcluded that bargaining can reach the maximization of social surplus, is moreefficient than prohibitive regulation of the government regulation.The fifth part is countermeasures and Suggestions to perfect the relatedtransactions of listed company supervision system. Firstly, based on the assumptionof complete information, I compare the two main bodies’ cost-benefit of related partytransactions, I feel very lucky to obtain the efficiency standards of related partytransactions. Then I try to introduce the punitive damages to establish a newmechanism for supervision of related party transactions--punitive damagesmechanism of illegal related transactions. In the end, I raised a number of policyrecommendations to improve the related party transactions regulatory system. |
